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On 2 November 1795 (or 11 Brumaire year III, as it was styled in the French 
revolutionary calendar), the Directory was instituted as the new governing regime of France. 
In contrast to many of the famous moments of the French Revolution which had preceded it, 
ƚŚĞŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚƚƵƌŶŽƵƚƚŽďĞƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐůŽŶŐĞƐƚ-lasting regime was a 
muted affair: on a dreary autumn day, the five men of the executive Directory (the body which 
gave its name to both the regime and the period it reigned, 1795 to 1799) met in the sparsely 
furnished Luxembourg Palace, and began the work of ending the Revolution and restoring 
order to a nation riven by six years of political and social upheaval.1 This unexceptional 
beginning stands in stark contrast to the dramatic and bloody days of the Thermidorian 
Reaction, which had ended the Terror by bringing down Robespierre and his fellow Jacobins, 
and which signalled the beginning of the end for the previous regime, the National 
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?DĂƌƚǇŶ>ǇŽŶƐƉĂŝŶƚƐĂǀŝǀŝĚƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨWĂƌŝƐĂƚƚŚĂƚŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “WůĂĐĞĚĞ
Grève littered with the human debris of the Revolutionary GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐŝĂŶ
crowd out in force.2 Some 15 months later, the Directory was installed with no fanfare and 
with scant optimism outside its own ranks. 
Yet what began in such inauspicious conditions was not just the most tenacious of the 
revolutionary regimes, but one which introduced entirely new institutions and practices that 
would remain fixtures of French politics well into the nineteenth century. The novelties of the 
Directory were both numerous and significant, yet the period has long suffered a tarnished 
reputation. It is thus rare to find a facet of the Revolution about which historians of all times 
and paradigms are in consensus, but the Directory has received nearly universal 
condemnation and dismissal in the past two centuries. The victim of partisan historians 
ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞůǇ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŽƌĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚEĂƉŽůĞŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ƌĞŐŝŵĞ, or of others arguing 
over whether the Jacobin republic was the apex or nadir of the Revolution, the Directory has 
found itself employed as ammunition in debates over the apparently more exciting periods 
on either side of it. Assessments of the regime on its own have been few, an alarming fact 
                                                          
1 M. Lyons, France Under the Directory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 23. 
2 ibid., p. 8. 
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given that it was the longest-lived of the decade. It is noteworthy that the explosion of work 
on the Revolution that marked its 1989 bicentenary almost entirely ignored 1795 and beyond, 
ĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞDĂůĐŽůŵƌŽŽŬ ?ƐŚŽƉĞƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŽǁŶďŝĐĞŶƚĞŶĂƌǇĚŝĚŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽ
bring any new enthusiasm for the maligned period.3 
This neglect is curious, but nevertheless well-entrenched in the historiography of the 
ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞĂďƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇĂƌŐƵĂďůǇďĞŐĂŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŚĂĚ
even been toppled. As Abbé Sieyès, Napoleon and his brother Lucien, and their fellow 
conspirators were preparing their meticulous plans for the coup of 18-19 Brumaire Year VIII 
(9-10 November 1799) they were well aware of the need to discredit the existing 
constitutional arrangement as inherently broken, and its leaders as corrupt, self-serving, and 
ineffective. Several of these conspirators (notably Sieyès and Napoleon) were already well-
versed in the art of winning popular sentiment, and sympathetic reports of the coup appeared 
ĂůŵŽƐƚŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?dŚĞƌƵŵĂŝƌĞŽƵƉƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨEĂƉŽůĞŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ascendency, and thus its perceived legitimacy remained crucial to Bonapartists for (at least) 
ĂĐĞŶƚƵƌǇƚŽĐŽŵĞ ?&ƌĞŶĐŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐǁŚŽŐƌĞǁƵƉŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨEĂƉŽůĞŽŶ ?ƐƚƌŝƵŵƉŚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚ
as Albert Vandal, were often eager to justify his seizure of power by discrediting the 
democratic experiments of the 1790s. Under their guidance, the narrative of a crumbling, 
morally bankrupt regime run by bureaucrats who had betrayed the principles of the 
Revolution in order to preserve their own power became a compelling one, especially when 
contrasted with the glory (not to mention the eventual internal stability) of the Consulate and 
the First Empire. 
The arrival of the twentieth century brought little relief to the beleaguered legacy of 
the Directory. As the Marxist, or structural, interpretation of the French Revolution emerged 
as a dominant explanatory force, historians found new reasons to condemn, dismiss, or 
simply ignore the Directory. Compared to the explosive class conflicts these historians found 
in the Jacobin republic, the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇǁĂƐĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ
regrettable reversals at best (at least from the perspective of interesting historical study) and 
boring bourgeois inaction at worst. For these historians, the Revolution proper died with 
Robespierre, the next five years representing but a shadow of the radical aspirations and bold 
                                                          
3 M. Crook, Napoleon Comes to Power, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), p. ix. 
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popular actions of 1789-1794.4 The Revolution had devoured its greatest figures, leaving the 
lame ducks to limp along until being put out of their misery by Napoleon. The preponderance 
of books from this era which end at Thermidor Year IV, or which lump the Directory together 
with the Consulate in slim books that feel more like appendices than scholarly tomes (such as 
^ŽďŽƵů ?ƐLe Directoire et le Consulat in 1972), belies the continuing lack of serious 
consideration given to the second half of the revolutionary decade. 
Despite this general disdain for or indifference towards the Directory, the Marxist 
tradition did give us some of the first attempts to present the regime on its own terms. A key 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐĞŶŝƐtŽƌŽŶŽĨĨ ?ƐLa République bourgeoise de Thermidor à Brumaire, 1794-1799 
(translated into English as The Thermidorean Regime and the Directory, 1794-1799 in 1984).5 
As the French title suggests, Woronoff espouses the argument that the Directory primarily 
represented the appropriation of the Revolution by the moderate middle-class, who brought 
an end to the radical populism and revolutionary drive of the Jacobin republic. Yet he was still 
unable to resist the allure of the surrounding periods. Much of the book is dedicated either 
ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ǁith the popular democracy of the 
Convention, or to the emergence of the Napoleonic legend on the battlefields of Italy and 
Egypt. Thus the Directory, though drawn more clearly than in previous works that , remains 
tarred as both the antithesis of revolutionary democracy and the political nonentity that 
Bonaparte so easily swept aside when the time was right. 
The emergence of revisionist historiography of the Revolution in the second half of the 
twentieth century brought some glimpses of hope for a rehabilitation of the Directory. Several 
historians pointed out the poor state of historiography on the period, and laments to that 
effect (not dissimilar to this very essay) became commonplace in book introductions. Martyn 
Lyons, writing shortly after Woronoff (who, in fairness, also began his book with the 
observation that the Directory had been poorly treated by historians, though did not do much 
to redress those perceived wrongs), was among the earliest to call for a reappraisal in his 
                                                          
4 See, for instance, G. Lefebvre, Quatre-Vingt-Neuf, (Paris: la Maison du livre français, 1939), or A. Soboul, La 
Révolution Française, (Paris: P.U.F., 1965), both of which give scant but critical attention to 1795-1799. It ought 
to be mentioned, however, that Lefebvre did give a course on the Directory which was later edited and 
published by two of his students, Soboul and J.-R. Suratteau: La France Sous le Directoire, (Paris: Éditions 
sociales, 1977), which critiques at length the Directorial regime. 
5 D. Woronoff, La République bourgeoise de Thermidor à Brumaire, 1795-1799, (Paris: Seuil, 1972). 
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France Under the Directory.6 This work was conceived mainly as a means of bringing together 
and summarising the contemporary studies of the Directory for the English reader but Lyons 
nevertheless made a foray into cultural history and presented a more sympathetic view of 
the Directory than had really been seen to that point. He made an explicit attempt to assess 
the period on its own terms as a revolutionary regime. While acknowledging the importance 
of the Terror and the Thermidorian Reaction to the development of the new constitution and 
ĂƐĂƚŽƵĐŚƐƚŽŶĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚƐŽĨďŽƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?>ǇŽŶƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞ ?-
year-long period as more than just a response to the earlier regime, emphasising its 
achievements as well as its failures. His analysis of changes within Directorial society is 
particularly interesting, as it problematizes the simplistic view, propagated by Marxists, of 
post-sans culottes France becoming dominated by a reactionary bourgeoisie. 
This theme of political culture was one which garnered immense attention over the 
ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďŝĐĞŶƚĞŶŶŝĂů ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ
leading figures, both anglophone and francophone, in the history of the Revolution The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture.7 These revisionists were 
largely critical of the Revolution as a whole, seeing it as defined more by circumstance and 
violence than by democratic ideals and arguing against the view that the Revolution contained 
the seeds for European democracy. However as influential as these arguments have been, 
virtually all of these studies focused on the period 1789-1794, ending with the fall of 
Robespierre in 1794 and neglecting the Directory almost entirely. Indeed, even those few 
articles that explicitly address the Directory seem to downplay its relevance and its 
uniqueness, either by linking it directly to the Terror or by characterising it as a period of 
stagnation marked by the occasional interesting event (such as the Babeuf plot). 
This neglect has begun to be redressed however, largely driven by investigations into 
the political culture of the Revolution. Two important studies of the electoral systems of the 
Revolution as a whole, one francophone and the other in English, each emphasised the 
uniqueness of the Directorial regime in that area, reasserting its credentials both as a 
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ  ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƉůĂĐĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ
                                                          
6 M. Lyons, France Under the Directory. 
7 K. Baker, C. Lucas, F. Furet, M. Ozouf (eds.), The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political 
Culture, 4 Vols, (Oxford & New York: Pergamon Press, 1987-1994). 
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ĂƉƉƌĞŶƚŝĐĞƐŚŝƉ ? ?8 The importance of the Directory to an understanding of the origins of 
modern European democracy has been further emphasised in the 21st century through the 
works of James Livesey and Howard Brown. In Making Democracy in the French Revolution 
Livesey agrees with Gueniffey and Crook that the Directory was a period of democratic 
experimentation, clearly linked to both the revolutionary programs of the early 1790s and the 
much later development of popular democracy in the 1800s.9 He thus simultaneously re-
establishes the Directory within the revolutionary decade and restores the tattered 
democratic legacy of the Revolution. 
ƌŽǁŶ ?ƐEnding the French Revolution agrees that the Directory has much to say about 
modern democracy, but is far more critical of the regime and its methods.10 Where Livesey 
sees the attempts by the men of the Directory to answer political, social, and economic 
questions with new democratic principles as the fundamental link between the Revolution 
and the development of modern democracy, Brown points instead to the development of 
 ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ P ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ďǇ
institutionalised repression. The failure of the Constitution of 1795 to restore order meant 
that the Directory was forced to confront persistent political violence, which it did by 
forsaking the liberal democratic dreamƐ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ŽĨ  ‘ŝůůŝďĞƌĂů ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ? dŚĞǇ
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ
reminiscent of the old anti-ŽŶĂƉĂƌƚŝƐƚƐǁŚŽĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇŽĨĐƌƵƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
hopes for a liberal democratic settlement by creating, or at least institutionalising, the 
mechanisms of state repression wielded with such efficacy by Napoleon. While Brown makes 
these arguments with nuance and extensive research, they are far from unassailable. Why, 
for instance, should we accept his critique of earlier analyses of Directorial democracy (such 
as that of Livesey) for their focus on institutions and averred principles rather than political 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŝƐ ŶŽ ĚŽƵďƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ƐŚould be 
considered supremely so has failed to be thoroughly convincing. Nevertheless, his work 
                                                          
8 P. Gueniffey, Le Nombre et la Raison: La Révolution française et les élections, (Paris: École des Hautes Études 
en Sciences Sociales, 1993), and M. Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
9 J. Livesey, Making Democracy in the French Revolution, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
10 H. Brown, Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon, 
(Charlottesville & London: University of Virginia Press, 2006). 
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makes a fascinating counterpoint to Livesey, and the debate raised by these two books is 
indicative of the fertility of the field of post-Jacobin democracy. 
One specific area within this field that has thus far avoided any particular attention, 
however, is the parliamentary system that was established in 1795. This remains a curious 
omission given the attention other parliamentary systems during the Revolution have 
received. There are some comparative or at least general reference works whose scope 
includes the entirety of the revolutionary decade and so touch on the Directory. Jacques 
'ŽĚĞĐŚŽƚ ?Ɛ>ĞƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĚĞůĂ&ƌĂŶĐĞƐŽƵƐůĂZĠǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĞƚů ?ŵƉŝƌĞ, for example, provides 
a very brief summary of the two Councils created by the Constitution of 1795 but contains 
minimal analysis.11 As a comparative reference it is useful in highlighting differences between 
the various regimes, but fails to answer some of the more specific questions. Why, for 
instance, did France suddenly adopt a bicameral system? Godechot acknowledges the change 
but brushes off its significance, opting simply to stick with his Marxist roots and emphasise 
ƚŚĞ ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? 
However, most historians who have concerned themselves with parliamentary 
democracy have chosen to focus on specific assemblies. Some of the notable works in this 
category are the dictionnaires of deputies to those various assemblies. The late Edna Hindie 
>ĞŵĂǇ ?ƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚĂŶĚ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ
of such works.12 However, no such study has been done on the men of the Directory since 
ƵŐƵƐƚĞ<ƵƐĐŝŶƐŬŝ ?ƐLes Députés au Corps Législatif (comprising the Conseil des Cinq-Cents 
and the Conseil des Anciens) in 1905, yet more evidence of the lack of interest the Directory 
ŚĂƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĂŶĚĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐƌĂƐƉŽŶǁŚŽ ‘ƚŚĞŵĞŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?
actually were.13 
Besides the dictionnaires there have been several brilliant studies on the assemblies as 
political entities beyond the personalities they contained. Timothy Tackett, for instance, has 
tackled the National Constituent Assembly which emerged out of the Estates General, with a 
particular focus on the individual experiences and political development of the deputies as 
                                                          
11 J. Godechot, Les Institutions de la France soƵƐůĂZĠǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĞƚů ?ŵƉŝƌĞ, (Paris: P.U.F, 1951). 
12 E. H. Lemay (ed.), Dictionnaire des Constituants: 1789-1791, (Paris: Universitas, 1991), and E. H. Lemay (ed.), 
Dictionnaire des législateurs: 1791-1792, (Fernay-sŽůƚĂŝƌĞ PĞŶƚƌĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĚ ?ĠƚƵĚĞdu XVIII siècle, 2007). 
13 A. Kuscinski, Les Députés au Corps Législatif, Conseil des Cinq-ĞŶƚƐ ?ŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŶĐŝĞŶƐ ?ĚĞů ?ĂŶ/săů ?ĂŶs//, 
 ?WĂƌŝƐ P^ŽĐŝĠƚĠĚĞů ?ŚŝƐƚŽŝƌĞĚĞůĂZĠǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĨƌĂŶĕĂŝƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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recorded in their personal letters.14 The Legislative Assembly of 1791 was explored by C.J. 
Mitchell, who was especially critical of existing methods of defining political divisions within 
the Assembly.15 ƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ůŝƐŽŶWĂƚƌŝĐŬ ?ƐThe Men of the First French Republic16 
provides an excellent examination of the deputies who constituted (at least initially) that 
assembly, in addition to elucidating the manner of its functioning and some of the key issues 
and divisions that served to shape the course of the Revolution in the first, fraught years of 
French republicanism. 
However, when it comes to the Directory there is nothing of this kind. The glaring 
absence of such a study is ĂůůƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƵŶŝƋƵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ
parliamentary system. It was both the first bicameral system seen in France and the first 
republican model to establish a clear executive outside of the legislature, in contrast to the 
committee-based system of the Convention. The themes and questions raised in each of the 
above works are just as applicable to the next parliamentary arrangement in the sequence, 
and can serve as a useful basis for commencing an investigation into its complexities. 
The question of location, for example, is a seemingly mundane one, yet it reveals the 
depth of the practical challenges facing the deputies. Establishing a parliamentary culture was 
made all the more difficult by the lack of the purpose-built meeting sites of today. The 
challenges created by this absence of an appropriate location were emphasised by both 
dĂĐŬĞƚƚĂŶĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŽĨǁŚŽŵĞǀĞŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨŚŝƐďŽŽŬ ‘dŚĞ
ZŝĚŝŶŐ^ĐŚŽŽů ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞManège of the Tuileries in which the Legislative Assembly met after 
moving to Paris. While at first glance a minor issue, the consequences of venue decisions 
could be immensely influential. Poor acoustics made it difficult for many deputies to be heard, 
and (especially in the case of the hot, smelly riding school) conditions in these ad hoc meeting 
chambers were often far from conducive to extended periods of concentration. The agenda 
thus moved out of the hands of eloquent writers and into the mouths of exciting orators. 
Those with voices powerful enough to grab attention (and wit or brevity enough to hold it) 
became the new stars of the Revolution as politics increasingly became a matter of public 
                                                          
14 T. Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the emergence of a 
political culture (1789-1790), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
15 C.J. Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly of 1791, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988). 
16 A. Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792, 
(Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972). 
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performance, a fact observed of the Constituent Assembly by Lemay.17 The question of place 
was amplified under the Directory given that two Councils now had to be accommodated. 
Should they meet in the same location, or would the constitutional separation of the Councils 
be better complemented by a geographical separation? They initially opted for the former, 
with both Councils remaining in the Manège, but by 1798 the Conseil des Cinq-Cents had 
shifted across the river to the Palais Bourbon (site of the present-day Assemblée Nationale), 
which had been renovated over the previous three years in order to house the new legislature 
in more distinguished surroundings.18 The question of location became crucial at the end of 
the Directory, too, as a key element of the conspirators of the coup of 18 Brumaire was to 
convince the Council of Elders that the threat of insurrection in Paris warranted the 
extraordinary step of moving the Corps Législatif from the heart of the city to the palace of 
Saint Cloud, on its very limits, thus ensuring that Napoleon and his troops would have the 
time and space to carry out their plan.19 
Another crucial question to consider concerns the internal structures each Council 
established. Tackett demonstrated that the emergence of the committee system in the 
Constituent Assembly was largely an organic process, a reaction to contingent concerns 
rather than a clearly-conceived administrative plan.20 Despite this haphazard start, 
committees became central to parliamentary assemblies throughout the Revolution, to the 
point that at the height of the Terror executive power was effectively in the hands of powerful 
committees dominated by Jacobins. The dominance of the entire assembly by a handful of 
committee members was then a major concern to the Thermidorians who had ousted the 
Jacobins and were trying to create a new system that would not fall to the same threats that 
had plagued the preceding regime. How, then, would they reconcile their fear of committees 
with the fact that committees lay at the very heart of how French parliamentary democracy 
functioned? 
Despite admirable progress towards rectifying the unfairly maligned reputation of the 
Directory in recent years, the period continues to be a dark, indistinct blur in the 
                                                          
17 E. H. Lemay & A. Patrick, Revolutionaries at Work: The Constituent Assembly, 1789-1791, (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1996), pp. 5-7. 
18  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝů ĚĞƐŝ Ƌ-ĞŶƚƐĂƵƐƵũĞƚĚĞů ?ŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůĂ
ŶŽƵǀĞůůĞƐĂůůĞĚĞĐĞĐŽŶƐĞŝů ? ? ?ĞƌWůƵǀŝƀƐĞĂŶs/ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
19 Lyons, France Under the Directory, pp. 233-234. 
20 Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, pp. 220-222. 
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historiography of the French Revolution. Much remains to be done to bring clarity and focus 
to our understanding of a period significant in its longevity and its position at the close of 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ  ? ? ? ?-
1799 requires extensive analysis in order to bring it to a state comparable to that of the 
Constituent and Legislative Assemblies and the Convention. Without a clear image of how 
that system functioned (and, on occasion, how it failed to function) our verdict on the 
democratic legacy of the French Revolution will remain flawed. This thesis endeavours to 
illuminate, at least in part, the innovations of Directorial parliamentarianism, from the radical 
novelties of the Constitution of 1795 to the internal practices the deputies developed. It will 
thus add to the growing boĚǇ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬƐ ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ Őƌŝŵ ůĞŐĂĐǇ ďǇ





Regression or Innovation? The revolutionary debates over the 
introduction of bicameralism 
 
Much like the Directorial regime it established, the Constitution of 1795 (also known as 
the Constitution of Year III, or the Constitution of 5 fructidor) has faced heavy criticism from 
historians of all colours in the past two centuries.1 It has often been considered the antithesis 
of the radical popular democracy exalted by the Constitution of 1793, a regression into 
conservative, limited democracy where property, not equality, was the prime principle.2 For 
a variety of reasons a comparison of these two constitutions is natural. Their respective 
authorships, for example, are clearly linked: the former being the product of triumphant 
Montagnards and Jacobins in the wake of the fall of the Girondins in the Convention, while 
the second was created by the Thermidorians who overthrew those Jacobins and sought to 
distance themselves from the Terror of the Jacobin years. Created by a commission within the 
dŚĞƌŵŝĚŽƌŝĂŶŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? “ŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
republican ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚƵƐƌŝŐŚƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?3 Yet it is 
ƚŚĞƌƵƉƚƵƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŵŽƐƚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞƚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
history. The re-introduction of financial qualifications on citizenship (harkening back to the 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ  ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ? ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ?4 the 
addition of a list of the duties to the declaration of the rights (which were themselves notably 
restricted in comparison to those listed in 1793) of man and citizen, and the establishment of 
an oligarchic executive have all been highlighted for their relative parts in the continuity with 
or digression from the constitutional projects of the Revolution. 
                                                          
1 Z ?ZĠŵŽŶĚ ? ‘ZĞƉĞŶƐĞƌů ?ĂŶ/// ? ?ŝŶR. Dupuy & M. Morabito (eds), 1795: Pour une République sans Révolution, 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996), pp. 11-12. 
2 See, for example, M. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle de la France de 1789 à 1870, t. 1, (Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1932), p. 293. 
3 J.-P. Machelon,  ‘>ĂŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĚƵ ?ĨƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌĂŶ/// ? ? ?ĂŽƸƚ ? ? ? ? ? PĂƌĐŚĂŢƐŵĞŽƵŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚĠ ? ? ?ŝŶ' ?ŽŶĂĐ ?
J.-P. Machelon (eds), La Constitution ĚĞů ?an III, (Paris: PUF, 1999), pp. 31-32. 
4 &ŽƌŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƉŝĐƐĞĞt ?, ?^ĞǁĞůů ? ‘>ĞĐŝƚŽǇĞŶ ?ůĂĐŝƚŽǇĞŶŶĞ PĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?WĂƐƐŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ
ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ŝŶ ?>ƵĐĂƐ ?ĞĚ ? ? ?The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, 
vol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 105- ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚD ?ƌŽŽŬ ? ‘dŚĞEĞǁZĞŐŝŵĞ PWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
Institutions and Democratic Practices under the Constitutional Monarchy, 1789- ? ? ? ?ŝŶ ?ŶĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĞĚ ? ? ?The 
Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 222-225. 
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Of all the innovations of the Constitution of 1795, the introduction of bicameralism is 
perhaps the most radical, yet also among the least studied. The division of the legislature into 
two Councils has often been seen as a novelty in the negative sense: a curious but ultimately 
unimportant feature ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉůĂǇĞĚ ůŝƚƚůĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ Žƌ ŽĨ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
modern political culture. Martyn Lyons, for instance, includes bicameralism among the 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂĚĞ ŝƚ  “Ă ŵŝůůƐƚŽŶĞ ? ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĐŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Directory.5 By contrast, Denis Woronoff attempts to hold off on a decisive judgement, 
preferring to end his very brief assessment of the introduction of bicameralism with a 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ P “tĞƌĞƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĞĂĐŚĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŚĂŵďĞƌ ?
as TŚŝďĂƵĚĞĂƵĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ? ? EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ ŝƐ ůĞĨƚǁŝƚŚ ůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚ ƚŚĂƚtŽƌŽŶŽĨĨ ?Ɛ
own take is a negative one.6 
That such treatment has not yet been sufficiently rectified is particularly surprising in 
the wake of the renewed interest in the Constitution of 1795 which accompanied its 
bicentennial, now twenty years past. In the many papers presented on the topic in the second 
half of the 1990s7 bicameralism is sometimes cited as an area which deserves greater 
attention yet that call has remained largely unanswered. In a notable example, Marcel 
DŽƌĂďŝƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚǁŽŬĞǇ “ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇƵŶƐĞĞŶĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?Žƌ “ƌĞŚĂďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ
power.8 Similarly Michel Troper iĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ  “ƚŚĞ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ĂƐĂŶ
ingenious solution to a critical problem faced by the framers of the Constitution of 1795 
regarding the separation of powers,9 while Jean-Pierre Machelon described bicameralism as 
 “ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ? ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞƌŝĐŚĞƐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
Thermidorians.10 
                                                          
5 M. Lyons, France Under the Directory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 18-20. 
6 D. Woronoff, La République bourgeoise, (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1972), pp. 41-42. 
7 See, for example, Conac & Machelon (eds.), >ĂŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĚĞů ?ĂŶ///; M. Vovelle (ed.), >ĞƚŽƵƌŶĂŶƚĚĞů ?ĂŶ///, 
(Paris: Editions du CTHS, 1997); and Dupuy & Morabito (eds.), 1795: Pour une République sans Révolution, 
which resulted from an international conference on the Constitution of 1795 held in Rennes in June-July 1995. 
8 D ?DŽƌĂďŝƚŽ ? ‘>ĞƐŶŽƵǀĞĂƵƚĠƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŶĞůůĞƐĚĞů ?ĂŶ/// ?, in Dupuy & Morabito (eds), 1795: Pour une 
République sans Révolution, pp. 167-177. Equally interesting is the ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ‘ĠďĂƚ ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-215), in which 
DŽƌĂďŝƚŽ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŝĂůďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂƌĞďƌŝĞĨůǇĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞĚĂŶĚĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚƵƉŽŶ ? 
9 D ?dƌŽƉĞƌ ? ‘> ?ŝŶƚƌŽƵǀĂďůĞƐĠƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƐƉŽƵǀŽŝƌƐ ? ?Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795, (Paris: 
Fayard, 2006), pp. 129-146. 
10 Machelon,  ‘La Constitution du  ?ĨƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌĂŶ/// ?, p. 32. 
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That promise of future richness has yet to be fulfilled. The present chapter will build on 
the ideas of the historians listed above and their colleagues by examining the theory of 
bicameralism that emerged from the constitutional debates of the Thermidorian Convention, 
both in the Commission des Onze, the parliamentary commission charged with creating a new 
constitution; and in the plenary sessions from the summer of 1795, when discussion of the 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐďĞŐĂŶ ?dŚĞƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐǁŝůů ƚŚĞŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ
played out in the political reality of the Directory by investigating various facets of the new 
system, such as the working relationship between the two councils, and the dynamics 
between the councils and the executive Directory. 
Before we can make sense of Directorial bicameralism, it is imperative that we 
understand the ideas that led to its introduction. In general histories of the Directory this 
innovation is often contrasted with the rejection of a two-chambered legislature during the 
constitutional debates of 1789.11 The comparison is certainly warranted. In 1789 the main 
advocates for bicameralism were the members of a group which became known (mainly 
pejoratively, by their political opponents in the National Assembly) as the monarchiens.12 As 
the name suggests, the monarchiens were of a royalist bent, supporting the idea of a powerful 
monarch armed with an absolute veto maintaining dominance over a legislature weakened 
through division into two chambers. Such a system, they argued, would bring two major 
benefits. Firstly, it would ensure the swift and efficient resolution of any tension between 
these two branches of government. Secondly, it served the dual purpose of allowing the 
executive to act swiftly and authoritatively while ensuring that the legislative process was 
slowed and characterised by reason, stability, and steadiness. One the key monarchiens, Lally-
dŽůůĞŶĚĂů ?ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐŚĂŵďĞƌŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƉƌĞƐĐŝĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ P  “A 
single Assembly perpetually runs the danger of being led astray by eloquence, seduced by 
sophistry, confused by intrigues, enflamed by the passions that someone makes it feel, carried 
away by sudden movements it hears of, gripped by the terrors someone inspires in it, by a 
type of public outcry that surrounds it, and against which it does not dare to resist alone. ?13 
                                                          
11 See for example Woronoff, La République bourgeoise, pp. 41-42; and Lyons, France Under the Directory, pp. 
18-19. 
12 R. H. Griffiths, >ĞĞŶƚƌĞWĞƌĚƵ PDĂůŽƵĞƚĞƚůĞƐ “ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞŶƐ ? dans la Révolution française, (Grenoble: 
Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1988), pp. 55-56. 
13 Archives Parlementaires (AP), vol. 8, p. 516, Séance du 31 août 1789. 
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In formulating this conception of a bicameral system, the monarchiens took inspiration 
ĨƌŽŵ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐůŽŶŐ-time enemy and rival, Great Britain. This inspiration is apparent in their 
speeches during the early constitutional debates in the National Assembly, in which several 
monarchiens played lead roles as members of the first constitutional committee tasked with 
drawing up articles for discussion.14 When Lally-Tollendal, for example, introduced the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŽǇĂůǀĞƚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽf legislative power, [and] 
the centralisation of executive power are two political axioms that reason and experience 
ŚĂǀĞ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ Ăůů ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ? ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĞ
referred.15 This bold statement was followed by an overly elaborate reflection on the 
constitutional theory of the separation of powers, making frequent reference to English 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? “ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌŽŶĞĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽ,ŽƵƐĞƐ
ŽĨWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ1688, no country has enjoyed in its interior a more 
complete tranquillity than that enjoyed in England. Nowhere is property more sacred; 
nowhere is individual liberty more intact; nowhere are the rights of humanity and political 
ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŵŽƌĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?16 
Whether the ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞŶƐ ? anglophile inclinations specifically counted against them in 
these debates is unclear, but evidently they did not help. As the debates went on a division 
became increasingly clear between the monarchiens committed to an English model and 
those deputies committed to the philosophy of Rousseau regarding the principles of national 
sovereignty and the General Will.17 In an impassioned speech Mounier, one of the key leaders 
of the monarchiens, decried these Rousseauian opponents on 4 September, rebuking those 
ǁŚŽ “ďůŝŶĚůǇŝŶǀŽŬĞƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵƐŽĨĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌǁŚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇĨƌĞĞ
when they chose their representatives, who considered representation as a kind of 
ƐĞƌǀŝƚƵĚĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉůŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ŶŽƚ  “ƚŽ ĐĂƐƚ Ă ůŽŽŬ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĞmpt on the Constitution of 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ďƵƚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŝƚ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ Ɛƚŝůů ?18 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐƐĞŵďůǇǁĂƐƵŶŵŽǀĞĚďǇDŽƵŶŝĞƌ ?ƐƉůĞĂƐ ?ĨƚĞƌƚĞŶĚĂǇƐŽĨŚĞĂƚĞĚĚĞďĂƚĞ ?
                                                          
14 < ?D ?ĂŬĞƌ ? ‘&ŝǆŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ< ?D ?ĂŬĞƌ ?Inventing the French Revolution, (Cambridge: 
ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŬĞƌ ?ƐĐŚĂƉƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƐƵĐĐŝŶĐƚĂŶĚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵůŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ
1789 constitutional debates and the power struggles between the monarchiens and their opponents. 
15 AP, vol. 8, p. 514, Séance du 31 août 1789. 
16 ibid., pp. 514-515. 
17 ĂŬĞƌ ? ‘&ŝǆŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
18 AP, vol. 8, p. 563, Séance du 4 septembre 1789. 
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the questions of a royal veto and a bicameral legislature were decided by the Assembly and 
the entire monarchien programme was roundly defeated. A royal veto was adopted, but only 
as a suspensive power rather than the absolute veto favoured by the monarchiens, and far 
more devastating to their aspirations was the 849-to-89 landslide in favour of a unicameral 
legislature.19 
The primary reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, it was feared that a bicameral 
legislature would lead to the establishment of an aristocratic chamber, such as that of 
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ,Žuse of Lords. In his response to the monarchien DŽƵŶŝĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŽĨĂ
divided legislature on 4 September 1789, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne repeatedly argued that the 
ŶŐůŝƐŚƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐŶŽƚƐƵŝƚĂďůĞƚŽ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?20 tŚŝůĞŚĞĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ,ŽƵƐĞ 
of Lords did have the effect, so desired by the monarchiens ?ŽĨ “ƐůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚŽƵƐƉĂĐĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂŶƵŶĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?  “Ă ĚŝƐĐovery and not an 
ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?21 ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚĂƐĂďƵĨĨĞƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ “ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ <ŝŶŐ ? ? ŝƚ ŚĂĚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ďĞĞŶ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐ ĂŶ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?22 
In the wake of the abolition of feudalism, accomplished only a month previously, and of 
the disintegration of the hierarchy of social orders, the idea of emulating a system that 
reinforced such social divisions must have seemed to many deputies an almost outrageous 
prospect. Many deputies had already been suspicious of the ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞŶƐ ? aristocratic 
heritage (such as Lally-Tollendal) and leanings: even in May 1789 Robespierre wrote of 
Malouet, another prominent monarchien ?ƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ “ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐƵƐƉĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŽĚŝŽƵƐŽĨ
ĂůůƚŚĞƉĂƚƌŝŽƚƐ ? ?ƵƐŝŶŐĞvery kind of intrigue to ensure that the aristocratic party prevailed at 
the Estates General.23 Their advocacy for a form of legislature so clearly tied to the sort of 
hierarchy of social orders from which France was slowly trying to extricate itself was thus 
easily interpreted by many as a scheme to reintroduce privileges, not least by their more 
                                                          
19 J. Egret, La Révolution des Notables, 2nd Edition, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1989), p. 152. 
20 AP, vol. 8, pp. 567-572, Séance du 4 septembre 1789. 
21 ibid., p. 568. 
22 ibid. 
23 Robespierre à Buissart (24 Mai, 1789), in G. Michon (ed.), VƵǀƌĞƐĚĞDĂǆŝŵŝůŝĞŶZŽďĞƐƉŝĞƌƌĞ, vol. 3: 
 ‘ŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ? ?WĂƌŝƐ PPhénix Éditions, 2000), p. 41. 
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popularly-minded opponents in the National Assembly who saw the defeat of the monarchien 
project as a means of gaining control of the assembly.24 
Notable among these opponents was the Abbé Sieyès, who had foreseen the attraction, 
especially for the privileged orders, of a constitution based on the English model in his popular 
pamphlet YƵ ?ĞƐƚ-ce que le Tiers État? (What is the Third Estate?).25 He devoted an entire 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŝƐĞƚŽĐƌŝƚŝƋƵŝŶŐƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ “Ă
reĂů ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
ŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ ŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞ P  “,ŽǁĐŽƵůĚǇŽƵǁŝƚŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐŽĚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŚŽƉĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ŝŶ
&ƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂƐŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ?26 KŶĞŽĨ^ŝĞǇğƐ ?ĐŚŝĞĨĂŝŵƐǁĂƐto abolish 
the distinction between the privileged orders and the Third Estate, and a parliamentary 
system that would enshrine privileges in the form of an upper chamber from which the Third 
Estate would be excluded was incompatible with such a goal since a privileged chamber would 
ĂůǁĂǇƐ ?ŝŶŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?ďĞĨŝůůĞĚ “ǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?27 Interestingly however, Sieyès would later propose, or at least accept as a 
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  “ŶŽƚƚǁŽŽƌƚŚƌĞĞŚĂŵbers, but two or three sections of the 
ƐĂŵĞ ŚĂŵďĞƌ ? ?28 Such a division, presumably made by lot rather than any qualitative 
distinctions, would allow deputies to discuss the same issues simultaneously but separately 
before reuniting to vote. Sieyès reminded his fellow deputies that while the National 
ƐƐĞŵďůǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ “KŶĞĂŶĚ/ŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ “ƚŚĞƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚ
indivisibility of an Assembly is unity of decision, not unity of discussion ? ?29 This explanation 
may appear to verge on being verbal gymnastics, Sieyès contorting definitions with the skill 
of a talented politician, however it was not a model without precedent: after all, the National 
Assembly had been dividing itself into small bureaux for separate discussions. Indeed, while 
the proposal was never given much attention in 1789, it prefigured an attitude towards 
bicameralism that would re-emerge in the constitutional debates of 1795.30 
                                                          
24 Griffiths, Le centre perdu, pp. 69-72. 
25 E-J. Sieyès, YƵ ?ĞƐƚ-ce que le Tiers État? ? ?WĂƌŝƐ P&ůĂŵŵĂƌŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŚĂƉƚĞƌ/s ? ?s/ ‘KŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ
Ě ?ŝŵŝƚĞƌůĂŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂŶŐůĂŝƐĞ ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-113. 
26 ibid., p. 109. 
27 ibid., 106. 
28 AP, vol. 8, p. 597, Séance du 7 septembre 1789. 
29 ibid. 
30 DŽƌĂďŝƚŽ ? ‘>ĞƐŶŽƵǀĞĂƵƚĠƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŶĞůůĞƐĚĞů ?ĂŶ/// ?, p. 170. 
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The monarchiens were aware of their reputation and took pains to assuage the fears of 
deputies concerned by the threat of an aristocratic chamber. Lally-Tollendal addressed the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ P  “tŽƵůĚ ŝƚ  ?ƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞ ?ŽƌƵƉƉĞƌĐŚĂŵďĞƌ ?ďĞĨŽƌŵĞĚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚůǇ
called the nobility and clergy? Certainly not; that would perpetuate the separation of orders, 
the corporate spirit, which is the greatest enemy of the public spirit, and which a universal 
ƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝƐŵƚŽĚĂǇƐƚƌŝǀĞƐƚŽĞǆƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚ ? ?31 However by this point the question of whether the 
specific mechanisms of the proposed upper house would inevitably lead to its domination by 
the nobility or clergy  was unimportant: the very notion of an upper chamber was a danger 
that the vast majority of deputies were simply unwilling to take. 
The second major objection to bicameralism in 1789 was grounded in the theory of 
sovereignty and of representative government that had been developing through the course 
of the Estates-General and the subsequent National Assembly. Maurice Cranston identifies 
three theories of sovereignty that had emerged during the eighteenth century and were 
particularly influential among the deputies at the Estates General.32 Firstly, there was the 
enlightened absolutism of Voltaire, according to which sovereignty resided solely in the 
person of the monarch. Montesquieu had advocated a division of sovereignty between the 
monarch and constitutional institutions, whether existing bodies, such as the parlements, or 
new ones created specifically for the purpose, such as a parliamentary assembly. Finally, the 
republicanism espoused by Rousseau insisted that sovereignty be unified, yet should not 
pertain to a single person or body. Instead, it was the totality of the people that was to be 
sovereign. All three of these streams of thought were represented at the Estates General, and 
it was only over the course of that doomed body and the subsequent National Assembly that 
ĂĐůĞĂƌƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇďĞĐĂŵĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ?/ŶŝƚŝĂůůǇŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚDŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ?ƐǁĂƐƚŚĞ
favoured outline. Michael Fitzsimmons points out that although Sieyès, in YƵ ?ĞƐƚ-ce que le 
Tiers État?, had pushed for the abolition of orders and the appropriation of sovereignty by 
ƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚƐƚĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐďǇŝƚƐĞůĨ “ĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?33 ƚŚĞ “ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐŚŽƉĞ
ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚƐƚĂƚĞǁĂƐĂ ‘ƵŶŝŽŶŽĨŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ?ĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚ be derived the blueprint 
                                                          
31 AP, vol. 8, p. 519, Séance du 31 août 1789. 
32 D ?ƌĂŶƐƚŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞ^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽĨƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ>ƵĐĂƐ ?ĞĚ ? ? ?The French Revolution & the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture, vol. 2, pp. 97-98. 
33 Sieyès, YƵ ?ĞƐƚ-ce que le Tiers État?, p. 33. 
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for a constitution.34 Sovereignty was thus envisaged as belonging jointly to the king and 
whatever institutions might be established from this union of orders. 
However, the inability of the Estates General to reach a consensus on any sort of 
programme35 had led the deputies of the Third Estate to declare themselves the National 
Assembly on 17 June,36 followed three days later by the Tennis Court Oath in which the 
ĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶ  “ĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŽƐĞƚ ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ
vowed not to disband until they had done so.37 Even so, the nascent National Assembly had 
no clear plan of action or agenda, nor even any real consensus beyond the necessity of a 
constitution.38 It was not until the eventful evening session of 4 August, when the manifold 
institution of feudal privilege was abolished, that the path towards a new constitution seemed 
to take shape.39 
According to Fitzsimmons, the most significant effect of 4 August in regards to the 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ  “ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ďǇ ƚŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?40 By 
eliminating the legal distinctions between the estates, the National Assembly had achieved in 
August what Sieyès had called for in January. The totality of the population of France was now 
conceived of as a nation, a unified people governed by a monarch whose powers would be 
determined by an elected assembly through the creation of a constitution. It was thus the 
representatives in the National Assembly who truly exercised sovereignty, rather than the 
indiǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽŵĂĚĞƵƉƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ ƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ  ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇƌĞƐŝĚĞƐŶŽƚŝŶĂŶĂŐŐůŽŵĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
ďƵƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƵŶŝƚǇĂƐ ‘ĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚďŽĚǇǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞŐŝǀĞŶƌĞal power through 
a system of representative democracy.41 This was precisely what Sieyès meant when he 
                                                          
34 D ?W ?&ŝƚǌƐŝŵŵŽŶƐ ? ‘^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůWŽǁĞƌ ? ?ŝŶŶĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĞĚ ? ? ?The Oxford Handbook of the 
French Revolution, p. 206. 
35 M. P. Fitzsimmons, The Night the Old Regime Ended: August 4, 1789, and the French Revolution, (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), pp. 4-5. 
36 AP, vol. 8, p. 127, Séance du 17 juin 1789. 
37 Ibid., p. 138, Séance du jeu de paume. 
38 Fitzsimmons, The Night the Old Regime Ended, pp. 9-10. 
39 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
40 &ŝƚǌƐŝŵŵŽŶƐ ? ‘^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
41 Troper, Terminer la Révolution, p. 111. 
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ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚƉĞƌƚĂŝŶƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƚŽŝƚĂůŽŶĞ ?ƚŽ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁŝůůŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?42 
Contrasting with the theory of national sovereignty is the idea of popular sovereignty, 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚ ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
dependent on the unity of these people but on their status as citizens, who have the right to 
participate in the creation of laws.43 As Troper points out, a crucial difference between 
national and popular sovereignty is the conception of representation each theory produces. 
Whereas national sovereignty is based on elected representatives realising the abstract 
nation, popular sovereignty is based on the participation of all, implying universal suffrage 
and as close to direct democracy as is practicable. If the people must choose representatives 
for the purpose of law-making, then those representatives must carry a binding mandate 
given to them by their constituents and from which they must not stray.44 
By August 1789, the idea of national sovereignty had achieved dominance in the 
thinking of the deputies in the National Assembly. For them, the sovereignty of the nation did 
not pertain to a mass of individuals but to the abstract concept of the nation, a single entity. 
Ideally this nation would exercise its sovereignty directly, through the meeting of its diverse 
constituent parts, however such a system was simply impracticable in a nation as large and 
populous as France. Even in 1795 this view was still prevalent, as evident in some of the 
proposals the Commission des Onze, charged with drafting the Constitution of Year III, 
received froŵĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŝĨ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
was not greater than that of Athens, and that of Sparta, it would have no trouble establishing 
a pure democracy, but with 25 million people, and at least 6 million voters, creating the 
physical impossibility of meeting in one place to deliberate, the French nation is thus forced 
to be content with a representative government which most closely approaches a pure 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?45 
The centrality of the concept of national sovereignty to the National Assembly is clearly 
illustrated by the debate over bicameralism. If it was to be the people as individuals who were 
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44 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
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sovereign then there may exist a plurality of wills, and if the general will could be divided then 
so too could the legislature designed to express that will. On the other hand, if, as was the 
ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐǀŝĞǁŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁŝůůƉĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĚŽŶůǇƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŶŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞĂƐ “ŽŶĞ
ĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ?,Žǁ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ĐŽƵůĚĂĚŝǀŝĚĞĚůĞŐŝslature 
rightly interpret and express the general will of an indivisible nation? Sieyès made this point 
ĐůĞĂƌŝŶŚŝƐŵŽƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞŶĂŵĞƚŚĞĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚƐƚĂƚĞĂƐƚŚĞ ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞ “ƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁŚŽĐŽŵƉŽƐĞŝƚĂƌĞƚŚĞŽŶůy legitimate and publicly known 
and proven representatives, and because they have been sent directly by nearly the entirety 
of the Nation, and finally because representation being one and indivisible, no deputy, 
regardless of order or class, has the right to exercise his functions separate to the present 
ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?46 The idea of a bicameral legislature was practically antithetical to this theory of 
national sovereignty, and it was primarily for this reason that the monarchiens ambitions in 
1789 concluded in such a dismal failure. 
Yet despite the unequivocal rejection of bicameralism in 1789, a mere six years later 
(albeit six of the most politically tumultuous years France has known) that very institution was 
introduced under the Directory. How was opinion reversed so radically by 1795? What 
specific ideas or circumstances had changed that led the members of the Thermidorian 
Convention to adopt as a central aspect of their project for a new republican regime a system 
proposed by moderate royalists in 1789? Understanding this change will reveal much about 
nascent French democracy in the revolutionary decade, and its importance for succeeding 
regimes. In order to develop such an understanding, it is necessary first to turn to the 
establishing document of the Directory, the Constitution of Year III, and in particular consider 
the circumstances of its creation. 
The Constitution of 1795, was created in haste and against a backdrop of instability and 
unrest, yet it was still the longest and most comprehensive constitution France had yet seen. 
Following the fall of Robespierre and his fellow Jacobins in Thermidor Year II (July 1794), the 
remaining deputies of the Convention soon recognised that they needed a firm foundation 
by which to legitimise their claim to power. Although a constitution had been written for the 
Convention in 1793, it had never actually been promulgated, ostensibly due to the necessity 
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of Revolutionary Government in order to address the war that had begun in 1792. Instead, 
the Constitution of 1793 had immediately been placed within a specially constructed cedar 
chest sitting in the meeting hall of the Convention. The fact that this box had been constructed 
in advance of the constitution has prompted Bronislaw Baczko to question the sincerity of the 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ:ĂĐŽďŝŶĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ĂƐŬŝŶŐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĞǀĞƌŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽŵƵůŐĂƚĞŝƚŽƌŝĨ
they had ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ĂƐ  “ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? ?47 
Nevertheless, when it became clear that Revolutionary Government had to give way to 
Constitutional Government, an extant constitution was naturally the first place the deputies 
of the Thermidorian Convention turned.48 
In early April 1795 (Germinal, Year III) a Commission des Sept was thus appointed to 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞǁŚĂƚ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝĐůĂǁƐ ?ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞƉĂƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ
the implementation of the Constitution of 1793. However even at this point many deputies 
(including Sieyès, who was himself a member of the Commission des Sept) were already 
steadfastly opposed to a constitution associated so closely with the legacy of Jacobin violence 
and tyranny, and instead wanted a new constitution altogether. The Constitution of 1793 
contained several features that were radical and well ahead of their time.49 It would have 
introduced universal manhood suffrage, for instance, and significantly expanded the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to include social rights such as education and 
public assistance. While many of these features appear familiar to modern democracies, in 
the midst of revolutionary France they were too drastic for some deputies to accept at such 
an early stage. Furthermore, the haste with which the Constitution of 1793 had been written 
and the questionable process of its approval, with barely any debate in the Convention 
 ?ĨƌĞƐŚůǇƉƵƌŐĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝĞƌĐĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ:ĂĐŽďŝŶƐ ?ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐe by a plebiscite 
held in suspicious circumstances, had done little to persuade more moderate deputies that 
the Constitution was a desirable, let alone valid, basis for government.50 
The opponents of the Constitution of 1793 got their way in a mere three weeks, when 
the Commission des Sept was replaced by a new committee, the Commission des Onze, which 
was given instructions to draft a new constitution. Soon afterwards any misgivings held by 
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proponents of the former constitution regarding this new direction were swept away on 1 
WƌĂŝƌŝĂů  ? ? ?DĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĂ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚŵŽď ŝŶǀĂĚĞĚƚŚĞ ŽŶǀĞƚŝŽŶĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐ  “ƌĞĂĚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ ? ? ? ?KŶĞĚĞƉƵƚǇ ?&ĠƌĂƵĚ ?ǁĂƐŬŝůůĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŚĂůů ?ŚŝƐŚĞĂĚŵŽƵŶƚĞĚ
on a pike and held up for the sitting president of the Convention, Boissy-Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ ?ƚŽŐƌĞĞƚ ?
for the amusement of the crowd; Boissy-Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ ?ƐƚŽŝĐŝƐŵŝŶƚŚŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ĨŽƌ ŚŝƐ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ Śŝŵ Ă  “ƉůĂĐĞ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŚĞƌŽƐ ? ?51 Several 
deputies sided with the mob however, and after the uprising was put down by the army and 
by militias from moderate sections of Paris the dominant moderates in the Convention were 
swift to arrest and condemn these rebellious deputies, whose deaths (either by suicide or 
guillotine) were memorialised as thĞ “DĂƌƚǇƌƐŽĨWƌĂŝƌŝĂů ? ?52 
Prairial served as a vindication of the decision to abandon the Constitution of 1793 and 
bring about the end of the Revolution by creating a new, constitutional government. 
However, the surge in anti-Jacobin sentiment that followed the Prairial uprising (together 
with a similar one earlier, in Germinal) also played into the hands of royalist counter-
revolutionaries who had been capitalising on the demise of Robespierre and were swiftly 
becoming as worrisome to the Thermidorians as the populist insurrectionists in Paris.53 This 
left the Commission des Onze with the challenging task of crafting a new constitution which 
ǁŽƵůĚƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞǁĂǇ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
the resurgent royalist right and the remnants of the radical left, preventing either extreme 
from dominating the new government. 
Despite having been appointed in April, the Commission des Onze does not seem to 
have commenced its work in earnest until early May, and its report was delivered to the 
Convention on 5 Messidor (23 June).54 In the six intervening weeks the eleven constitutional 
theorists of the Commission created the longest and most rigorous constitution France had 
seen. After two months of debate in the Convention, the Constitution of 1795 was ratified on 
 ?&ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌ/// ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
1791, which took almost two years to complete despite being significantly shorter, this was a 
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staggeringly fast achievement. Admittedly the Commission des Onze had the two earlier 
constitutions from which to draw inspiration, but to attribute their expeditiousness to 
plagiarism would be to ignore both their explicit intent to differentiate the new constitution 
from that of 1793 and, far more importantly, the originality and innovation of the Constitution 
of 1795, not least in its introduction of bicameralism. 
Little is known of the proceedings of the Commission des Onze, as no minutes were kept 
of their meetings. What we do know must be gleaned from the draft projects they produced, 
and the marginalia and corrections some of these contain, however even this is difficult as 
the various drafts were not dated, complicating the task of following the development of the 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?thoughts. The vast majority of the documents stemming from the Commission that 
are stored at the Archives Nationales are letters and constitutional drafts from citizens, 
political clubs, and even fellow deputies in the Convention. These are copious and are 
themselves fascinating: many, for example, already enthusiastically suggest a two-chambered 
legislature, such as that of a doctor, F. Saléles, whose contribution included a veritable 
treatise lamenting the necessity of occupations such as agriculture which prevent men from 
spending their whole time thinking about and debating political matters.55 Both his 
enthusiasm for politics and his advocacy of bicameralism are typical of the material received 
by the Commission des Onze, which invites further investigation to try to discern how the idea 
of bicameralism came to be apparently so widespread already in 1795. 
It is clear that bicameralism was intended to be a central feature of the new constitution 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨ ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚƐĂƌe undated, the earliest can 
nevertheless be identified by a number of distinctions compared to the others, such as the 
absence of the declaration of rights and discrepancies in the nomenclature used for various 
groups and positions, notably the two legislative councils and the executive Directory.56 In the 
case of the apparent first draft, several of the terms used seem to have been carried across 
from the Constitution of 1793, such as Conseil Exécutif, however it is the departures from that 
document that are the most marked. The Conseil Exécutif of the 1795 draft, for instance, was 
no longer the 24-man assembly proposed in 1793 but a small, 5-man council which already 
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lacked any role in the passage of legislation, its powers being confined to foreign policy, 
military appointments, and a number of other important but non-legislative areas. In fact, the 
executive Directory as described in the final Constitution of 1795 was significantly 
strengthened compared to its initial conception in this first draft. It appears that the idea of 
an executive veto was briefly revisited, but was swiftly rejected in favour of creating a second 
legislative chamber whose sole function would be to approve or reject the laws proposed by 
the first chamber. Initially the two chambers were to be titled (somewhat confusingly) the 
 ‘Directoire ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘Sénat ? ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨ&ŝǀĞ-Hundred and Council of 
Elders respectively.57 
Why, then, was bicameralism adopted apparently so easily in 1795 when it had been so 
forcefully opposed in 1789? Firstly, it is evident that the primary reasons bicameralism was 
opposed in 1789 were no longer as strong. The fear that a second chamber would come to be 
dominated by the aristocracy had been strongly diminished over the course of the past six 
years, as emigration, exile, and the Terror had greatly reduced the existing aristocratic 
population of France. Still, the Commission des Onze took no chances in this regard, laying out 
in painstaking detail the manner by which deputies of the two councils would be elected. A 
crucial element of the system was the fact that deputies for both councils would be drawn 
from the same broad pool of candidates. Voting was made indirect, with primary assemblies 
meeting to elect deputies to the second-level electoral assemblies, who would then elect 
deputies from among their own ranks to the Corps législatif. Each electoral council would first 
elect to the Council of Elders deputies who met the age and marital status requirements 
(Elders were required to be at least 40 years and either married or widowed), followed by the 
appointments to the Five-Hundred. This system served several purposes for the Thermidorian 
constitutionalists, but one important role was to ensure that no distinction according to social 
class would emerge between the two councils. The system was summarised in the 
presentation of the draft constitution to the Convention on 5 Messidor (23 June), in contrast 
to those systems from which the Commission des Onze were eager to distance themselves: 
 “A chamber of hereditary peers is the product of feudal pride, in order to preserve 
ƚŚĞƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌŽŶĞ ? ?Ă^ĞŶĂƚĞǁŝƚŚ
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a life-long term is an aristocratic institution no less contrary to the sacred 
principles ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ ? ?tĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞŽŶůǇƚŽĚŝǀŝĚĞƚŚĞ
Corps législatif into two councils equally elected by the people, appointed for the 
same length of time, and only different from each other in the number and age of 
ƚŚĞŝƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?58 
Furthermore, ideas about sovereignty had gradually changed over the course of the 
Revolution, undermining the other powerful objection to bicameralism in 1789. One of the 
most significant ruptures between the Constitution of 1791 and that of 1793 was the concept 
of who was sovereign. The Constitution of 1793, written during the emergence of powerful 
populist politics following the triumph of the Jacobins over the Girondins in the Convention, 
ŚĂĚĚĞƉĂƌƚĞĚĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝĚĞĂŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ in favour of a more 
ĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ? “dŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƉĞŽů ŝƐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇŽĨ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?
which has tended to be interpreted as implying popular sovereignty.59 The Constitution of 
 ? ? ? ?ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? “dŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇŽĨ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ
ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ? ? ǇĞƚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ǀŝĞǁŽĨ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ? ? ? ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ă
break with the radical democracy and popular sovereignty of 1793 and a return to the 
national sovereignty of 1791.60 Michel Troper, however, has argued persuasively that both 
the language regarding sovereignty in the Constitution of 1795 and the institutions it outlines 
suggests that the ThĞƌŵŝĚŽƌŝĂŶƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ?61 This continuity must be considered alongside the evidence that 
the Constitution of 1795 moved away from the popular sovereignty of 1793, such as the 
reintroduction of tax-related conditions on suffrage.62 Nevertheless, it is clear that the firm 
and widely held notion of national sovereignty seen in 1789 had significantly weakened by 
1795, allowing the serious consideration of alternative ideas about how the national 
legislature could be structured in order to perform its role of interpreting and expressing the 
 ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁŝůů ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? 
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Just as the main reasons for opposing bicameralism in 1789 had been eroded by 1795, 
the experiences of the intervening years had raised certain institutional problems to which a 
bicameral legislature seemed to offer a solution. The dangers, foreshadowed by the 
monarchiens in 1789, of a single chambered legislature, and especially one that incorporated 
the executive, had been well and truly realised over the course of the Revolution, above all in 
the Jacobin domination of the Convention during the period of Revolutionary Government. 
Even in the early debates in the Thermidorian Convention about the potential adoption of the 
Constitution of 1793, many voices called for patience and slower movement. Cambacérès, for 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ?  “ŐŽŽĚ ůĂǁƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ ŶŽƚ ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ
ƐŝŵƉůǇĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?ůŝŬĞDŝŶĞƌǀĂĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĨƵůůǇĂƌŵŽƵƌĞĚĨƌŽŵ:ƵƉŝƚĞƌ ?ƐŚĞĂĚ ? ?63 For many it was 
the unbridled pace of the Convention that had been its undoing, and over the following 
months a theme became evident: we must not go too quickly; we must take our time. 
A bicameral legislature presented an interesting means of slowing the pace of 
governance down while preventing it from grinding to an absolute halt. Boissy-Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ
expounded at length on this point when he presented the constitutional project of the 
Commission des Onze to the Convention on 5 Messidor (23 June) in a particularly powerful 
and evocative speech. First he observed the dangers of unicameralism, in terms not dissimilar 
to those used by Lally-Tollendal six years earlier but with a far more personal and emotive 
appeal to his colleagues: 
 “/ǁŝůůƉĂƵƐĞďƌŝĞĨůǇƚŽƌĞŵŝŶĚǇŽƵ of the inseparable dangers of a single assembly; 
I have on my side your own memories and the feelings of your consciences. Who 
knows better than you how strong, in a single assembly, the influence of one man 
ĐĂŶ ďĞ ?  ? /Ŷ Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ ƚǇƌĂŶŶǇ ŝƐ ŽŶůǇ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƐƚĞƉƐ ?  ? ŝƚ
establishes the throne of terror on a unique and solid base, and the most virtuous 
men are soon forced to appear to sanction crimes, to allow rivers of blood to flow 
until a fortunate plot manages to overthrow the tyrant and re-ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?64 
Having so vividly evoked the horrors of the previous years (while simultaneously 
ǁĂƐŚŝŶŐŚŝƐĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇŽƚŚĞƌƐƵƌǀŝǀŝŶŐĚĞƉƵƚǇ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐŽĨŐƵŝůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?ŽŝƐƐǇ-Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ
                                                          
63 Séance du 10 germinal III (30 March 1795), Le Moniteur, 1795. 
64 Séance du 5 messidor III (23 June 1795), Le Moniteur, 1795. 
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then proceeded to the virtues of two-chambered legislatures in general, and of that proposed 
in the constitutional draft in particular. The Council of Five-Hundred, being composed of the 
ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐĨŽƌůĂǁƐ P “ŝƚǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƐŽƚŽƐƉĞĂŬ ?
the imagination of the republic; the Council of Elders will be its reason: it will have no other 
duty than to examine with wisdom which laws to adopt and which laws to reject, never having 
ƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƉƌŽƉŽƐĞůĂǁƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ ? ?65 It was the latter aspect, the reasoned examination 
of the Council of Elders, that would be the brake on any potential run-away legislation, and 
that would prevent the domination of the legislature of a particular personality or faction. 
It is clear, then, that the primary purpose of the introduction of bicameralism in 1795 
was to prevent the accumulation of power in any one assembly, and so to protect the new 
regime against the threat of factional domination and make it less vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of national politics; as Francois Furet put it, the TheƌŵŝĚŽƌŝĂŶƐƐŽƵŐŚƚ “ƚŽůŝŵŝƚ
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇďǇĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?66 In this sense, bicameralism was a logical accompaniment to the 
establishment of an executive council separate to but dependent on the legislature. Both new 
institutions aimed to slow the legislative process and prevent rash governance. The excesses 
of the Terror and the dangers of popular intimidation of the national government were all too 
fresh in the minds of the deputies of the Thermidorian Convention, and bicameralism 
provided a unique means of preventing a repeat of such events, while also providing the new 
regime with the measured, stable legislative process so desired by the Thermidorians. 
However, it was only one such means in a Constitution which seemed to take the 
decentralization of power as its foremost objective. As we shall see, several of the measures 
adopted in the name of separating or balancing powers in the Constitution of 1795 had 
profound effects on the practical functioning of the new bicameral system. Looking at how 
these measures played out will help us to see the rupture between the idealistic bicameral 
theory of the Constitution of 1795 and the gritty reality of post-Jacobin democracy. 
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Relations Between the Legislative Councils and the Executive 
Directory 
 
The division of governmental powers was a central tenet in the Constitution of 1795. The 
parliamentary arrangement established in 1795 was novel not just for the introduction of 
bicameralism, but also for the creation of an executive body which would be separated from the 
legislative Councils but nonetheless bound to them. In many ways the executive Directory 
appeared a subservient member in the relationship; for example, its five members were chosen 
ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? ŝƚ ůĂĐŬĞĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ŚĂĚŶŽ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ ǀĞƚŽ ŽŶ
legislation, its role in the legislative process being reduced to little more than a rubber stamp. Yet 
from its inception in the constitution the Directory was clearly intended to be a powerful 
institution, the centrepiece of the new government, and one need not look far to see the 
enduring legacy of that intent. Not only did the executive organ give its name to the period over 
which it presided, but virtually every political history of those years focuses on the policies, 
tactics, actions, and problems of the Directors, giving little attention to the deputies of the 
Councils.1 Indeed, where the Councils are mentioned it tends to be in the context of their 
opposition or submission to the will of the Directors, being portrayed at times as just another 
obstacle for the Directory to try to navigate its way around, and at others as a weak and 
directionless bureaucracy powerless to resist the force of the Directory. 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the accuracy of this depiction, and to explore 
more deeply the relationship between the Directors and the legislative Councils. Many questions 
remain to be answered regarding how the legislative and executive functioned alongside each 
other, ranging from what their quotidian functions in the governance of revolutionary France 
looked like, through to questions of personal relationships and the importance of rumour and 
                                                          
1 The four most notable in this category are M.J. Sydenham, The First French Republic, 1792-1804, (London: B.T. 
Batsford, 1974); G. Lefebvre, La France sous le Directoire, 1795-1799, (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1977); D. Woronoff, 
La République Bourgeoise, de Thermidor à Brumaire, 1794-1799, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972); and M. Lyons, 
France Under the Directory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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factionalism in both the Councils and among the Directors themselves. By addressing these 
questions we will arrive at a more thorough and complicated understanding of the difficulties the 
revolutionaries faced in attempting to establish a parliamentary, democratic republic, while also 
developing an assessment of the degree to which they were successful in that ambition. 
Unlike many aspects of the Directory, the broad political narrative of the period has been 
relatively well explored in a handful of general assessments of the regime in the second half of 
the twentieth century, although many details remain to be filled in or debated.2 Through these 
political narratives a general stream of thought has emerged regarding the flux of power between 
the executive Directory and the legislative Councils. This interpretation, is marked by a number 
of key aspects. Firstly, it emphasises the rivalry and antipathy between the Directory and the 
Councils. These two bodies are perceived to be perpetually at odds with each other, each 
struggling for dominance over the other. Proponents of this view, such as Lefebvre, Sydenham, 
Lyons, Woronoff,3 argue that the paradoxically rigid yet vague division of powers in the 
Constitution of 1795 left each of the Directory and the Councils (especially the Council of Five-
Hundred) with a bizarre array of governmental powers. The constitution gave the Directory most 
of the responsibilities associated with government, such as foreign relations, the military, and 
the appointment of government ministers as well as local officials.4 However, two crucial 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐǁĂƐďĞƐƚŽǁĞĚŽŶ
the Council of Five-Hundred, and secondly, the Directory lacked the power of an executive veto, 
meaning that the Councils retained full autonomy over legislation. By so clearly delineating these 
powers, the constitution established a confusing arrangement where the power to govern was 
unclearly located. In part, this was deliberate on the part of the framers of the constitution, who 
sought to prevent that power from coalescing within the hands of any one body.5 They intended 
to balance these two branches of government against each other, a model which surely seemed 
reasoned and conservative in the imaginations of the constitutional framers but which relied on 
                                                          
2 dŚĞĨŽƵƌǁŽƌŬƐĐŝƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞĂƌĞĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĞďĞƐƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞtŝůůŝĂŵŽǇůĞ ?ƐThe Oxford History of the 
French Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) summarises succinctly most of the advancements that 
have been made in the subsequent three decades. 
3 ibid. 
4 Lyons, France Under the Directory, p. 19. 
5 Lefebvre, La France sous le Directoire, p. 72. 
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the ability of the two bodies to co-operate. The constitution made no provision for breaking a 
deadlock, a catastrophic oversight on the part of the framers. Thus, when the Directory and 
Councils inevitably came into conflict there was no clear legal solution; as Lyons points out, the 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ  “ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŝĨ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŚŽƐƚŝůĞ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? ƚŽ ƉĂƌĂůǇƐĞ ƚŚĞ
Directory. The Directory, which had no power of dissolution, and no veto, could only reply by 
ƵŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ?6 
This raises a second key feature of the commonly held view of the relationship between 
the Directory and the Councils, namely the focus on the ĐŽƵƉƐĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ that peppered the period. 
The four successful coups carried out between 1797 and 1799 are taken as the turning points in 
the political narrative of the Directory. These were, in chronological order, the coups of 18 
Fructidor in Year V (4 September, 1797), 22 Floréal Year VI (11 May, 1798), 28-30 Prairial Year VII 
(16-18 June, 1799), and finally, the coup of 18-19 Brumaire Year VIII (9-10 November, 1799) in 
which Napoleon Bonaparte and his fellow conspirators overthrew the Directory and lay the 
foundations for the Consulate. The fact that these coups occurred on a roughly annual basis 
certainly makes for a neat chronological division when describing the story of Directorial politics, 
and there is certainly merit in such an organisation. 
The coup of Fructidor in particular is taken as a critical moment for the new regime, marking 
the point when the Directory apparently abandoned the constitution and pursued repressive, 
often violent policies in order to preserve itself. In order to understand the coup and its 
significance in the legacy of the Directory, it is necessary to have a sound grasp of the complex 
context in which it was carried out. When the regime had been installed in Brumaire Year III 
(October-November, 1795),7 the majority of the membership of both the Councils and the 
Directory itself had been committed to the idea of a liberal democratic republic which would 
ƚƌĞĂĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞǁĂǇ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŽǇĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ:ĂĐŽďŝŶƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ?8 This was initially ensured by the 
infamous Law of Two-Thirds which stated that two-thirds of the membership of the new Councils 
                                                          
6 Lyons, France Under the Directory, pp. 19-20. 
7 The National Convention had been suspended on 4 Brumaire (26 October) with the new regime officially taking 
office a week later on 11 Brumaire (2 November). 
8 Sydenham, The First French Republic, pp. 130-143. 
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would consist of ex-Conventionnels. However, the royalist cause had been gathering momentum 
since the fall of the Jacobins in Thermidor Year II (July, 1794), and the results of the elections of 
Year IV (which were carried out by the same primary assemblies, immediately following the 
referendum on whether or not to accept the Constitution of 1795, the document which 
established the very institutions that were subject to these elections) displayed the extent to 
which royalism had grown in popularity.9 While the liberal republicans retained firm control of 
the new Corps Législatif, roughly half of the new third of deputies were royalists of some kind, 
whether absolutists or constitutionalists.10  
This did not bode well for the new regime, and the royalists capitalised on their gains in the 
year and a half before the next elections in Year V (1797). Taking advantage of new electoral laws 
that for the first time permitted declared candidatures, royalist associations and clubs across the 
nation organised nascent electoral campaigns by distributing lists of their desired candidates and 
spreading right-wing propaganda via newspapers, while refractory priests were particularly 
effeĐƚŝǀĞ  “ŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƌƵƌĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?11 The Jacobins were still recovering from Thermidor 
and so made little impact in the electoral campaigns of 1797, but the liberal republicans were 
quick to respond to the resurgent royalists, compiling their own lists of candidates and using the 
press to push their agenda. However, when the election results emerged in Floréal (April-May) it 
ďĞĐĂŵĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽŶƚŚĞ
legislative Councils. Royalists had been successful in sixty-two out of ninety-eight départements, 
while only seven départements returned unequivocally favourable results for the government.12 
The liberal republicans quickly began to lose their grasp on government. The fervently royalist 
general Pichegru was elected as president of the Council of Five-Hundred, despite being 
suspected of treasonous dealings with émigrés and foreign powers while commanding the Army 
of the Rhine, suspicions which were soon proven with assistance from Bonaparte although the 
evidence was kept secret by Barras until an opportune moment.13 His counterpart in the Council 
                                                          
9 M. Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 132-133. 
10 Lyons, France Under the Directory, p. 20. 
11 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, pp. 141-145. 
12 P. Gueniffey, La Nombre et la Raison, (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1993), p. 501. 
13 Sydenham, The First French Republic, p. 138. 
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of Elders was Barbé-Marbois, who Lefebvre identifies as one of the instigators of the Brunswick 
Manifesto in 1792 which threatened reprisals against France if any harm should come to the royal 
family.14 Meanwhile another royalist, Barthélémy, was elected to the Directory to replace 
Letourneur, on whom the lot had fallen to step down. Fate had fallen on the side of the liberal 
republicans in this regard, since Letourneur had been largely ineffectual during his time as a 
Director (La Revellière->ĠƉĞĂƵǆ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ Śŝŵ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ  “ũƵƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŚŽ ŽĨ ĂƌŶŽƚ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ
departure did not disrupt the control over the executive held by La Revellière-Lépeaux, Barras, 
and Reubell, the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘triumvirs ? ?15 
A schism had thus formed between the legislative Councils now dominated by royalists, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ?triumvirs. Precisely the 
situation for which the Constitution of 1795 made no provision had eventuated, and it was only 
a matter of time until one side or the other would give way. La Revellière-Lépeaux argued that 
this was the case in his defence of the coup of Fructidor, agreeing with Lefebvre and Lyons that, 
 “ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨzĞĂƌ ///ŚĂĚƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇŶŽ ůĞŐĂůŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ?dŚŝƐĨĂŝůŝŶŐǁĂƐŝƚƐƌƵŝŶ ? ?16 Yet the reaction against the 
royalist electoral successes was not immediate. More electŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞŚĞůĚŝŶĂǇĞĂƌ ?ƐƚŝŵĞ ?
after all, so if the Councils and the Directory were able at least to tolerate each other until then, 
perhaps the conflict could be resolved at the ballot box, either by the lot falling on one of the 
triumvirs to be replaced or by a reversal of the royalist gains of 1797. Early hopes for such 
peaceable co-operation were doused quickly. Not only did the two Councils appoint royalists as 
their respective presidents, but the secretarial positions for each had been similarly filled with 
 “ŶĂŵĞƐ ŚŽƐƚŝůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂƐ  “Ă ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?17 The Councils began agitating for the relaxation of laws against émigrés and 
refractory priests, and for a conclusion to the revolutionary wars; but on none of these issues 
was the republican majority in the Directory prepared to concede.18 A flashpoint soon emerged 
                                                          
14 Lefebvre, La France sous le Directoire, pp. 270-272. 
15 L.-M. La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires de La Revellière->ĠƉĞĂƵǆ ? QƉƵďůŝĠƐ par son fils, vol. 2, (Paris: E. Plon, 
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16 ibid., p. 60. 
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18 Lyons, France Under the Directory, p. 49.; and A.N. C//418 plaquard 21, pièces 33 & 54. 
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in the form of opposition in the Councils to the ministerial appointments the Directory had made. 
The remaining liberal republicanƐ  ?Žƌ  “ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇďĞŐĂŶƚŽďĞŬŶŽǁŶ ?
suggested that the Directors replace two ministers: Merlin de Douai as Minister of Justice, and 
Delacroix as Minister of Foreign Affairs.19 This act, it was hoped, would appease the royalists and 
allow the government to carry on under a tentative truce. There seems to have been little chance 
that an attempted appeasement of this kind would have succeeded, however, as the vocal 
royalists demanded a reshuffle of the entire ministry.20 
The Directory now held the initiative. Would they act on the potentially futile advice of the 
constitutionalists, succumb to the pressure of the royalists, or make a stand of their own and 
reject the Corps législatif ?ƐĐĂůůƐĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?dŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶŚŽǁthe allegiances 
ĂŶĚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƉĂŶŶĞĚŽƵƚ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĂƌƚŚĠůĠŵǇ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇƚŽƚŚĞ
Directory it was slightly less clear where everyone stood. According to Carnot, the initial reaction 
ŚĞ ĨĞůƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞĐĂůůƐŽĨ ƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƐǁĂƐ  “ƌĞƉugnance for this unconstitutional intrusion by the 
Corps législatif ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? ? ĂƐ ĂŶǇ ŵĂŶ ůŽǇĂů ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƌŐĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
constitution would.21 WƵƚƚŝŶŐ ĂƐŝĚĞ ĂƌŶŽƚ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ ƐůĂŶƚĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĞǀĞŶƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ
would play a key role in bringing about his expulsion from public life in Fructidor, his observations 
about the dynamics between the individual Directors, and between those Directors and the 
deputies of the Councils, are nonetheless fascinating. Like La Revellière, he acknowledges that in 
order for the constitution to remain intact it would be absolutely necessary to foster good 
relations between the Directory and the Councils. This, he claims, was his driving motivation for 
striving to form a majority within the Directory which would replace some, but not all, ministers.22 
Barthélémy, rather unsurprisingly, joined Carnot, while Reubell and La Revellière-Lépeaux 
formally refused. The fate of the nation thus fell to Barras, who comes across as something of an 
irresponsible and deceitful villain in the memoirs of both Carnot and La Revellière-Lépeaux, as 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶĂƌŶŽƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌ ?dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚƌĞĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĐůĞĂƌůǇ
shown their colours, Barras told Carnot that he would be willing to go along with a change of 
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20 A.N. AF//// ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚĞŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŝŶƋ- ĞŶƚƐĂƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞĠǆĠĐƵƚŝĨ ? ? ?DĞƐƐŝĚŽƌĂŶs ? 




ministers, as long as Carnot took the initiative in making the proposition.23 Carnot accepted, and 
on 26 Messidor (14 July) proposed the dismissal of four ministers that the legislative Councils had 
taken particular issue with.24 However, the moment the proposal was made to the Directory, 
ĂƌƌĂƐƐǁŝƚĐŚĞĚƐŝĚĞƐ ? “ĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞŚĂĚƉůĂǇĞĚĂ ĚŝƐŐƌĂĐĞĨƵůĂĐƚ ?ŽƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚďĂĐŬĂƌŽƵŶĚďǇŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ũŽŝŶĞĚ>ĂZĞǀůůŝğƌĞĂŶĚZĞƵďĞůů ŝŶ ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
proposal.25 Furthermore, the renewed Triumvirat seized the moment and, on the pretext of 
respecting the desires of the legislature, reviewed all ministerial positions. Their true intent, 
however, was revealed when, after a mere twenty minutes of discussion, they had ousted three 
of the ministers most closely associated with the royalist faction while boldly reinstating those 
most despised.26 For Carnot, this was the decisive moment at which conflict between the Councils 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ P “dŚĞTriumvirat, by this significant display, threw down the 
ŐĂƵŶƚůĞƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇƚŽƚŚĞŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞƚǁŽŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? ?27 
For La Revellière->ĠƉĞĂƵǆ ?ƐƉĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƚŽ&ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌǁĂƐŵŽƌĞĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than if, the balance between the executive and ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƵůĚĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ ?dŚĞ “ŚĂƉƉǇŚĂƌŵŽŶǇ
ĂŶĚ ƌĂƉŝĚ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ Ăůů ŬŝŶĚƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚǇƉŝĨŝĞĚ ? ŝŶŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ? ƚŚĞ
relationship between the Directory and the legislative Councils during their first sixteen months 
ended with the elections of Year V.28 The seizure of the Councils by the royalists and the 
appointment of Barthélémy were severe enough challenges by themselves for La Revellière, 
already a grim pessimist,29 to fear for the constitution. But to him, it was Carnot who revealed 
himself as the duplicitous Director responsible for forcing the executive and legislative arms of 
government into a conflict that could only be resolved by resorting to unconstitutional violence. 
Too astute to present himself as an outright proponent of the royalist cause, Carnot is portrayed 
ďǇ>ĂZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞĂƐĂƚĂůĞŶƚĞĚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐƚǁŝƚŚŶŽĨŝƌŵǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨŚŝƐŽǁŶ P “:ƵĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞ
                                                          
23 ibid. 
24 A.N. AF//// ? ? ? ? ? ‘^ĠĂŶĐĞĚƵ ? ?DĞƐƐŝĚŽƌ ? ? 
25 Carnot, Mémoires, vol. 2, p. 117. 
26 A.N. AF/III/457,  ‘^ĠĂŶĐĞĚƵ ? ?DĞƐƐŝĚŽƌ ? ? 
27 Carnot, Mémoires, vol. 2, p. 117. 
28 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 50-51. 
29 >ĂZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞĞǀĞŶĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐŚŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ “ĂƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚŵĞůĂŶĐŚŽůǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐ
never abandoned me and which gives to all my moral feelings an irresistible force, and to my character an energy 
which has not yet slowed, despite my sixty-ŶŝŶĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 1, p. 10. 
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number, the talents and firmness of the leaders, these new two thirds [in the Councils] could 
carry the balance, perhaps even without him, but certainly with him, he presented himself to 
ƚŚĞŵ ? ?30 La Revellière recounts at great length and in extraordinary detail examples of the shifts 
ŝŶ ĂƌŶŽƚ ?Ɛ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚŽŵ ŚĞď ŐĂŶ ƚŽ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞ ? ƉŝůŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚe 
evidence of his complicity in a supposedly impending royalist plot.31 
As the summer of Year V wore on the tensions between the Councils and the Directory 
worsened. In July the Councils discovered that Hoche, a general loyal to the Directory, had moved 
his troops within the 60 kilometre ring around the legislature that had been forbidden to military 
forces according to the Constitution, which precipitated a nervous wait while the Councils 
weighed up whether to attempt to impeach the Triumvirat. Eventually this push for impeachment 
petered out when it became clear that it would not have the support of Carnot, who passed off 
the incursion as a clerical error.32 By this point, however, virtually no-one expected the situation 
to last. Either the royalists would co-ordinate and oust the Triumvirs or the Councils would be 
purged. On 10 Fructidor (27 August), La Revellière delivered a stirring speech on the occasion of 
the arrival of General Bernadotte from the successful campaign in Italy, which announced the 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ P “/ƚǁĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽďĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚŽƌƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?33 
A week later the Triumvirs took decisive action and attacked. The three Directors ordered 
the republican troops they had steadily been amassing in and around Paris to occupy the Tuileries 
Palace, where the legislative Councils met, and to take control of tactical positions throughout 
ƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?dŚĞĐŝƚǇǁĂƐƉůĂƐƚĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚ>ĂZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞ ?ƐƉƌŽĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂƐƚŝůǇƉƌŝŶƚĞĚĂƚƚǁŽŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬ
in the morning, attesting to a royalist conspiracy and making plain the treasons committed by 
Pichegru as General of the Army of the Rhine.34 Carnot and Barthélémy were arrested, as were 
fifty-three of the leading royalist deputies; with the exception of Carnot, who was allowed to flee, 
                                                          
30 ibid., vol. 2 p. 51. 
31 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 2, chapters XXVII & XXVIII. 
32  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĠǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŝŶƋ-ĞŶƚƐƐƵƌů ?ĠƚĂƚĚĞƚƌŽƵƉĞƐĚĂŶƐůĂ
ĐŝƌĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĚĞWĂƌŝƐ ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌŵŝĚŽƌĂŶs ? 
33 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 126-127. 
34 Proclamation du Directoire annonçant aux Parisiens la découverte d'un complot royaliste, (Paris: Imprimerie du 
Directoire éxecutif, 1797), Collection de Vinck, 6944. 
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those arrested were deported to Guiana.35 The Triumvirs were incapable of carrying out this coup 
entirely without the support of the Councils and so special sessions of both the Five-Hundred and 
the Elders were swiftly assembled, each consisting of a carefully selected quorum of deputies 
and meeting under the watchful eye of the occupying military, in order to legalise retroactively 
the measures taken.36 Furthermore, they annulled the results of the elections the previous 
Germinal in 49 départements, resulting in a total of 177 empty seats in the Councils.37 
It is particularly important to note these last points, for they speak to the continuity as 
much as the break in the relationship between the Directory and the Councils on 18 Fructidor. 
Firstly, the fact that the purged Councils lost 177 out of a total of 750 seats demonstrates the 
weakness ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨďŽƚŚ>ĂZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞĂŶĚĂƌŶŽƚ PƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĨĂƌĨƌŽŵĂ “ƌŽǇĂůŝƐƚ
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ?38 True, their claims were not without some substance. That 
the royalists had grown influential was unquestionable, given their accession to almost all of the 
administrative positions within each of the Councils and their election of Barthélémy to the 
Directory. Furthermore, the treasons of Pichegru were indisputable and there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that royalist plotting of some kind was indeed going on with the support of 
British funds and agents, although how accurately this could be called a conspiracy, and how 
effective it might have been, remains a subject of debate. For instance, Albert Meynier argues 
that the royalists were too ineffective and disorganised to be considered a genuine conspiratorial 
threat, an opinion shared by Gueniffey.39 William Doyle, on the other hand, considers Fructidor 
ƚŽŚĂǀĞ “ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇƚŚǁĂƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĂŶĚĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ-backed royalist agents like 
the ex-ŵĂŐŝƐƚƌĂƚĞĂŶĚĚĞƉƵƚǇĚ ?ŶĚƌĠ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐ ‘ŐƌĂŶĚĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐůĞƐƐĂĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐǇĂŶĚ
more a long-term plan of electioneering.40 There had been discussion within the Councils about 
whether to impeach the Directors, but this had been proposed by liberal republicans as much as 
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37 Lyons, France Under the Directory, p. 50. 
38 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 50-52; Carnot, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 114-115. 
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France, 1927); Gueniffey, La nombre et la raison, p. 502. 




by royalists.41 However, it seems highly unlikely that a conspiracy posing the sort of imminent 
threat the Triumvirs warned of was actually in the works. 
Thus, we are left with a crucial question. If liberal republicans retained a majority in the 
Councils and there was no imminent royalist conspiracy to overthrow, why did the Directors, who 
were acutely aware of the weakness in the constitution and of the consequent need to preserve 
a workable relationship with the Councils, not appeal to like-minded deputies in order to 
counteract the influence of the royalists? Indeed, this is precisely the course of action Carnot 
claims to have advocated. He stresses in his memoirs that he deliberately limited his interaction 
with ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌŽǇĂůŝƐƚůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĞǀĞŶďĞĨŽƌĞŚĞǁĂƐŵĂĚĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨWŝĐŚĞŐƌƵ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ
only position himself as a conciliator between the competing factions in the Councils.42 La 
ZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞ ŝƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƌŶŽƚ ?ƐĞĂgerness to distance 
himself from connections with royalist leaders is more suspicious than exculpatory.43 Since both 
were writing around two decades after the fact, it is difficult to know precisely where the truth 
lay. 
Nevertheless, the battle over the legacy of the Directory waged soon after its collapse in 
the memoirs of those at the heart of the intrigues may provide us with several hints as to how 
we might understand the choice of the Directors to ignore the possibility of building a consensus 
between a moderate majority in both the Directory and the Councils. These memoirists 
bemoaned the circumstances in which they had found themselves and the lack of suitable 
constitutional powers or measures for addressing such exigencies, constantly shifting blame to 
each other or to the Constitution of 1795. La Revellière, for instance, lamented that the Directory 
ƚŽŽŬĐŚĂƌŐĞ ? “ŝŶĂŵŽŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂǁĨƵůĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ
ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŝŐŶĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞǁĂƐ “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŵŽŶĞǇ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚbread, without revenue, 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƉŽůŝĐĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĨůŽŽĚ ŽĨ ĂďƵƐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ǁĂƐƵŶĨĂŝƌůǇƚŚƌŽǁŶ ?44 Not only were the general conditions for governing bad, but 
                                                          
41 Sydenham, The First French Republic, pp. 137-138. 
42 Carnot, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 108-110. 
43 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 49-50. 
44 La Revellière-Lépeaux, Mémoires, vol. 1 pp. 305-308. 
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ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ “ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇƚƌĂƉƐ ?ĂƐƐĂŝůĞĚ relentlessly by royalism and anarchy, envied 
by the members of the two legislative Councils, who could never agree clearly and faithfully by 
ǁŚĂƚ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƉƌŽƐƉĞƌ ? ?45 Writing during the Bourbon Restoration, La 
Revellière felt particularly aggrieved by the way the coup of 18 Fructidor had come to be 
remembered. For him, 18 Fructidor had been a capitulation, in the direst circumstances, to the 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨ “ĂůůƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŽƵŶĐŝůƐĂŶĚŽĨĂŐƌĞĂƚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞ
citizens, who pressured [us, i.e. the Directory] to increase their powers and to prolong, for a great 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨ ŝƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?46 The coup is 
thus framed not as an assault by a the Directory on the elected deputies of the legislative Councils 
which paved the way for future abuses of power, but as the action of a reluctant, moderate 
government that had resisted the relentless demands of self-serving deputies for as long as 
possible before being overtaken by the crisis of resurgent monarchism in 1797. Even then, the 
ĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ? ?&ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌ ? “ǁŚŝĐŚƐŽŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁŚŽĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ
celebrated with an extraordinary enthusiasm, at least in appearance, today declare the most 
criminal act. ?47 
It is clear that for La Revellière, rather than Fructidor representing the moment when the 
Directory exerted dominance over the Councils and abandoned constitutional legalism, it was in 
fact a moment when the majority group in the Directory chose a side from among the factions 
within the Councils. This ought not to be confused with forming a consensus of the sort discussed 
thus far: the political violence of the actions taken during Fructidor cannot be ignored, and the 
coup essentially destroyed the basis for constitutional government in the following years. Yet La 
ZĞǀĞůůŝğƌĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĚŽĞƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞcoup that may help us to 
understand relationship between the Directory and the Councils, namely the roles of both 
personality and factionalism. Both of these aspects have already emerged, of course: the 
personal disagreements between the five Directors was central in the lead up to Fructidor, and 
the entire contest has been largely framed as a wrestle for control between a royalist faction and 
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a moderate republic faction, each of which was represented in both the Directory and the 
Councils. Nevertheless, personality and factionalism were more influential in the dynamic 
between the executive and legislative than has hitherto been acknowledged. For example, the 
personalities of the Directors and their conflicts have been well-researched, but the relationships 
between individual Directors and specific deputies remains less known. It is in the back-channel 
communications and alliances, whether forged out of political pragmatism or personal 
ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ƐŚĂůů ĨŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĂĚĂƉƚ ƚŽ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ
circumstances, pre-empt threats both within and without the legislature, and above all, to survive 
the kind of upheavals that had brought down earlier constitutional systems. 
So defining is the coup of 18 Fructidor in the legacy of the Directory that it has become 
common to refer to the pre-&ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘&ŝƌƐƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ? ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
 ‘^ĞĐŽŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞcoup which, according to most historians of the period, 
irreparably damaged the integrity and credibility of the Directorial regime as a whole.48 Georges 
Lefebvre, for instance, divided his voluminous assessment of the regime into two parts labelled 
 “Premier Directoire ?ĂŶĚ “Second Directoire ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?49 While Lefebvre did not present the 
First Directory particularly favourably, he saved the bulk of his criticism for the Second, beginning 
the second part of his ǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ “ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŝĂůdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƚƐƚŚĞƚŽŶĞĨŽƌ
the rest of the text.50 Lefebvre concurs with Carnot and La Revellière in attributing the root cause 
of this Directorial Terror to the Constitution of 1795 and its lack of any peaceful means of 
resolving conflict between the Directory and the Councils.51 He then continues the political 
narrative of the Second Directory by focusing on the lead up to and execution of the subsequent 
ĐŽƵƉƐĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ in Floréal, Prairial, and ultimately Brumaire, with brief interludes to look at how the 
Second Directory was increasingly repressive throughout French society. 
The significance of the shift from the First Directory to the Second cannot be overstated. 
The coup of 18 Fructidor left an indelible stain on the reputation of the Directory which 
                                                          
48 Lefebvre, La France sous le Directoire, p. 14. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid., pp. 439-456. 
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contributed not only to the succession of coups that followed, including that of 18-19 Brumaire 
which brought about the end of the Directory, but also to the negative view the entire Directorial 
period has endured over the subsequent two centuries. According to Howard Brown, by 
abandoning constitutional legalism and purging the legislative Councils in Fructidor the Directory 
announced the failure of liberal democracy to bring a peaceful conclusion to the French 
ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐĞƚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ  “ŵŽĚĞƌŶ  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞ ?ĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞǁŝƚŚ
ƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?52 This is certainly a strong argument, and there is little doubt 
that the restoration of order was seen by the Directors as the ultimate obstacle in the task of 
bringing the Revolution to a close and claiming legitimacy. Brown acknowledges the difficulty the 
moderate republicans faced in tracing out the middle way between the royalists and the radicals, 
but points out that the peril of democracy is that it only survives if the people governed by it are 
themselves committed to democracy.53 
However, this view perhaps ignores the relative stability that existed between the Directory 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ƉŚĂƐĞ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ
typified by co-operation throughout the first 18 months of the regime; that is, from its inception 
through to the elections of Year V and the royalist successes. The Law of Two-Thirds had achieved 
its goal of stacking the new Councils with enough like-minded moderates who were mostly happy 
ƚŽŐŽĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂů ƐƋƵĂďďůĞƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ, but these 
largely emerged comparatively minor or procedural issues, particularly when they felt that the 
Directors were exceeding the boundaries of their constitutional responsibilities and encroaching 
on those of the Councils. It is also true that finances were always a delicate topic between the 
Directory and the Council of Five-Hundred, given that the latter preciously guarded its control of 
the national budget despite the Minister for Finances being responsible to the Directory. Any 
time the Directory attempted to raise a financial issue, the Five-Hundred was quick to appoint a 
special commission to examine thoroughly the request or report, and to judge its worth. These 
                                                          
52 H. Brown, Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon, 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), pp. 14-16. 
53 ibid., pp. 38-46. 
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ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŽĨŝƚƐĂƚƚĞmpts to strong-
arm the Five-Hundred into acceding to whatever plans the Minister for Finances laid out.54 
However, this sort of response stands out as the exception to the general relationship between 
the Council and the Directory, rather than exemplifying the norm. For the most part, both 
Councils appear to have been in harmony with the agenda of the Directory. Special commissions 
were appointed to address virtually every message received by either Council from the Directory, 
and most met very briefly and cŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐ ? 
dŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨůĚĞƌƐƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂƚůĞĂƐƚ
as much as the Five-Hundred during the First Directory, although it is much more difficult to trace 
the lines of influence between the two. The Elders received far fewer messages than the Five-
Hundred, no doubt owing to the fact that they lacked the constitutional power to initiate 
legislation, and thus the only real influence that the Directory could hope to exercise over the 
Elders was to push them to approve or veto pieces of legislation sent to them by the Five-
Hundred. The Elders were relatively liberal with their use of the power of veto, and it is 
challenging to judge the extent to which they were swayed by the Directory one way or another. 
Interestingly, the Directors stopped short of outright requesting that the Elders vote one way or 
another on specific pieces of legislation. Instead, most of the messages received by the Elders 
from the Directory were simply explanatory, seeking to update the Council on military operations 
(usually victories),55 ongoing programs such as the attempt to establish a new system of weights 
and measurements,56 or the occasional copy account of a citizen holding an event to praise the 
republic.57 Compared to the flood of messages received by the Five-Hundred concerning every 
                                                          
54 See, for example, A.N.,  ?// ? ? ? ? ‘&ŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ? ? ? ?WƌĂŝƌŝĂů Year VI. 
55 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŶĐŝĞŶƐdonnant des nouvelles 
des armées de Rhin-et-Moselle et de Sambre-et-DĞƵƐĞ ? ? ?DĞƐƐŝĚŽƌĂŶ/s ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?); and A.N. C//496/328, 
 ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŶĐŝĞŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂŶƚůĞƐǀŝĐƚŽŝƌĞƐĚĞů ?ƌŵĠĞĚ ?/ƚĂůŝĞ ? ? ? ?&ƌŝŵĂŝƌĞĂŶ
V (30 November 1796). 
56  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝů ĚĞƐ ĐŝĞŶƐůĞŵĞƚƚĂŶƚĂƵĐŽƵƌĂŶƚĚĞƐƚƌĂǀĂƵǆ
ƌĞůĂƚŝĨƐĂƵƌĞŶŽƵǀĞůůĞŵĞŶƚĚĞƐƉŽŝĚƐĞƚŵĞƐƵƌĞƐ ? ? ? ?sĞŶĚĠŵŝĂŝƌĞĂŶs ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
57  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝl des Anciens lui envoyant ci-joint la copie d'un 
manifeste de Joseph, comte de Puisaye, lieutenant général des armées du Roi en Bretagne, aux 




ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ĨƌŽŵ ůŽĐĂů ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ůŽĐĂů ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
international relations (to take a snapshot of a single week),58 ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛcorrespondence 
with the Elders appears almost dismissive, as though the second chamber of the Corps Législatif 
did not need to be bothered with the intricacies of governing the nation but instead should have 
its spirits lifted with good news. Nevertheless, there was potentially a slight tendency of the 
Elders towards the Directory in that they rarely vetoed resolutions from the Five-Hundred that 
had been specifically requested by the executive. While a more thorough investigation of the use 
ŽĨƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐ ?ǀeto is needed, a sampling of resolutions rejected during the relative calm of 1796 
(Pluviôse year IV to Nivôse year V) suggests that a majority of the resolutions rejected were 
generated within the Five-Hundred itself, rather than at the prompting of a message from the 
Directory.59 
This generally co-operative relationship between the Councils and the Directory during its 
initial stage was, however, a fragile one. The disagreements, especially when the Five-Hundred 
took issue with matters of finance, may have been few but were nevertheless indicative of the 
lack of factional consensus among the moderates. Even in Year IV debates on the budget could 
become heated within the Five-Hundred, with deputies strongly divided over how far they should 
accede to the DireĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?60 The semi-permanent commission of finances in the Five-
Hundred was never short of demands for the Directory to make available more records of 
expenses from various ministries or projects. In Pluviôse Year V, for example, the Five-Hundred 
had clearly been perturbed by a report from the commission of finances and demanded to know 
 “ŽŶǁŚĂƚŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚŽŶǁŚĂƚĨƵŶĚƐƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞ ? ?61 
The formal structure of this official message does little to disguise the tone of indignation and 
                                                          
58  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝů ĚĞƐŝ Ƌ-Cents concernant les opérations de 
ů ?ĂƐƐĞŵďůĠĞƉƌŝŵĂŝƌĞĚĞĂƵŵĞ ? ? ? ?&ůŽƌĠĂůĂŶs ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞǆĠĐƵƚŝĨĂƵŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐ
Cinq-Cents concernanƚůĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŶĞŵĞŶƚĚĞů ?ĠĐŽůĞƉŽůǇƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ? ? ? ?&ůŽƌĠĂůĂŶs ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵ
Directoire Exécutif au Conseil des Cinq-ĞŶƚƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂŶƚůĞƐĨŽŶĚƐŶĠĐĞƐƐĂŝƌĞƐĂƵŵŝŶŝƐƚğƌĞĚĞů ?/ŶƚĠƌŝĞƵƌ ? ? ? ?
&ůŽƌĠĂůĂŶs ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞĚƵŝƌĞĐƚŽŝƌĞxécutif au Conseil des Cinq-Cents concernant les relations 
ĂǀĞĐůĂZĠƉƵďůŝƋƵĞĚĞsĞŶŝƐĞ ? ? ? ?&ůŽƌĠĂůĂŶs ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
59 This is on the basis of a sampling of rejected resolutions found in the following dossiers: A.N., C//484/160; A.N., 
C//485/179; C//486/197; C//487/213; C//488/228; C//489/245; C//491/260; C//492/276; C//493/293; 
C//494/307; C//495/322; C//496/334. 
60 A.N., C//390/139. 
61 A.N., AF/III/434, plaquette 2493/35. 
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anger that the deputies felt at the apparent autonomy the Directory had granted the court to 
ƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŽŶĞǇ ?/ƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽƵƐĞƐƵĐŚŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐƚŽƌĞŵŝŶĚ
the Directory which body was ultimately responsible for the national treasury. 
These tensions, although apparently minor, reveal that despite a period of relative peace 
and co-operation in the first year and a half of the Directory, the French government was still a 
long way from having an identifiĂďůĞŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĨŽĐƵƐŝƚƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞ
much-needed stability the nation craved. The royalist success in the elections of Year V were 
therefore a heavy blow to the fledgling relationship between executive and legislature. 
Immediately following the entry of the royalist deputies to the Councils, conflicts between the 
two bodies intensified. As early as Floréal, the Council of Five-Hundred was demanding to see the 
state of outstanding expenses from before the inauguration of the Directory itself, in addition to 
ƚŚŽƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ?
a development the Council deemed crucial to their control of the budget.62 The Directory replied 
tersely that they could not provide such information for at least a month, but by Prairial they had 
been so frustrated by the constant pestering of the Five-Hundred combined with an apparent 
ůĂĐŬŽĨĂĐƚƵĂůƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽŶƚŚĞďƵĚŐĞƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐĞŶƚĂŵĞƐƐĂŐĞĂƐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽ  “occupy 
yourselves seriously with finances ? ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂƌĞƉŽƌƚ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Minister of Finances.63 
Despite holding only a small minority of the seats in the Corps Législatif, the royalists had 
effectively disrupted the fragile co-operative relationship that had been developing between the 
Councils and the Directory. We have already seen how the Directors themselves reacted to this 
turn of events. Carnot (and to a lesser extent Barthélémy, once he entered the Directory) sought 
to build a consensus with the new Councils, whether out of an opportunistic desire to preserve 
his own power or a genuine desire to preserve the constitutional arrangement and continue the 
work of restoring order to France. Meanwhile, La Revellière-Lépeaux and Reubell were frustrated 
by the ambivalence of the mass of deputies who had supposedly shared their views but who were 
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63 A.N. AF/III/450, plaquette 2662/34; A.N. AF/III/451, plaquette 2669/1-4. 
46 
 
now being cowed by a vocal minority, and were becoming increasingly convinced that the 
executive and the legislature were on course for a collision that only one would survive. Barras, 
enigmatic as always, probably held more cards than any other, with his early knowledge of the 
treason of Pichegru and other evidence of a potential royalist conspiracy. Yet he waited until 
almost the final moment to play his hand and enable the coup of Fructidor. Whether it was the 
fault of the pugnacious royalist deputies, the inefficacy or complacency of the moderate 
deputies, or the inflexibility of the Directors, the delicate relationship between the Directory and 
the Councils that had taken 18 months of co-operation to develop was so shattered by a mere 5 
months of outright conflict that a purge of the legislature seemed the only possible recourse. 
Yet in the wake of Fructidor the nature of the relationship between the Directory and the 
Councils shifted rapidly. Although victorious in the coup, the triumvirs remained shaken by the 
apparent ease with which the royalists had taken command of the Councils. Both they and their 
allies in the freshly-purged legislature were eager to prevent a recurrence of such a scare, and 
they began planning accordingly. A collaborative relationship thus began to re-emerge between 
the moderates in the executive and legislature with the aim of perpetuating the moderate 
republic for which they had all but torn up the constitution. 
The Second Directory learned quickly from the problems of the First, and attempted to 
strengthen its ties to the Councils. Messages flowed between the Directory and the Council of 
Five-Hundred at an increasing rate in the months following Fructidor, raising all manner of issues 
and concerns, demands and requests. These messages indicate that a productive working 
relationship was developing between the Triumvirs in the Directory and the moderates in the 
Council, who were in turn coalescing into a more clearly delineated faction. While still not at the 
level of organisation or cohesiveness as either the Jacobins or the royalists, the moderates were 
seeking each other out more regularly and with more determination than had been seen since 
the Thermidorian Reaction. For some, this new-found factionalism was driven by a reawakened 
sense of insecurity, driven by the sense that the republic was under fresh attack. In the wake of 
Fructidor many deputies seemed more willing to speak out in defence of the republic against its 
perceived enemies both within and without France. 
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The coalescence of this moderate faction essentially constituted the development of a 
parliamentary government in France, more akin to the parliament of the United Kingdom or to 
the Congress of the United States than to the vision of a national assembly, representing the 
entirety of the people as a single whole, that had been at the centre of French democratic theory 
ever since the constitutional debates of 1789. Factionalism had always played a role in the 
legislative assemblies of the early years of the French Revolution, of course. Indeed, from the 
very start of the those debates in the National Assembly deputies had been considered as 
belonging to one or another faction, such as the Monarchiens who had so ardently desired a 
bicameral parliament or the Feuillants. Factionalism had reached a peak during the Convention, 
when Jacobins and Girondins were wrestling for power while various smaller factions such as the 
Hébertists or the Cordeliers, often overlapping with each other or with the dominant ones, vied 
for influence both within and without the assembly chamber.64 Yet even throughout that period 
the notion of formal party politics was scorned by the deputies themselves. Party politics was 
considered antithetical to the idea that each deputy to the national legislature represented the 
entirety of the nation, rather than separate constituencies, an idea which had been deeply 
ingrained in the nascent democratic political culture of France.65 
During the Directory, however, this fundamental concept was put under unprecedented 
strain. The collaboration between moderate republican deputies in the Councils and their like-
minded colleagues in the executive Directory, especially during the Second Directory, eventually 
established a de facto centrist party that operated along lines very similar to those of a modern 
political party, from the initiation and passage of legislature through to cohesive and co-
ordinated electoral campaigning. While the phenomenon of party politics (or at least a very 
rudimentary form thereof) emerging from the established factions of the Revolution will be 
examined in much greater detail in a later chapter, it is worth mentioning here due to the extent 
                                                          
64 The factionalism of the Convention, and the factions themselves, have been thoroughly explored by historians 
such as Patrice Higonnet in Goodness Beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
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to which the factions or parties needed to cross the barrier between the legislative Councils and 
the executive Directory in order to succeed. The odd distribution of governmental powers 
between the two branches meant that a faction needed to control both if it was to govern 
effectively. It was an acknowledgement of this fact that prompted the triumvirs to perpetrate the 
coup of Fructidor, as much as it was fear of a potential Royalist conspiracy. La Revellière, Barras, 
and Reubell were well aware that without a co-operative legislature their control of the executive 
would amount to nothing, and the nation would be condemned to yet more uncertainty and 
instability at a time when it most needed clear leadership and direction. 
Elections to the Councils thus became a central concern for the Directory. If the 
government could influence who constituted the legislative Councils, then there would be less 
danger to the working relationship between the executive and the legislature. In the lead up to 
the elections of Year VI (in March 1798), the Directory introduced a number of new strategies 
designed to influence the electorate and encourage a favourable result. During the elections of 
Year V the practice of declared candidatures had been introduced for the first time, allowing 
individuals to run openly for office. This experiment with electoral practices had turned out 
rather dismally for the moderate republicans, as it was one of the features upon which the 
royalists had leapt upon with fervour, and it was dropped a few months before the elections of 
Year VI.66 However, the Directory was still eager to get a head start on electoral rivals, and so 
gave itself the power to distribute lists of official candidates of their own choosing.67 Wary of the 
potential for a small but organised group to propel themselves to electoral success, the Directory 
was eager to promote electoral participation. A holiday was therefore declared to celebrate the 
 “^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŚĞůĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǁĞĞŬĞŶĚ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƉŽůůŝŶŐ ďĞŐĂŶ ?68 
Perhaps most strikingly, the electoral commissaires that had been sent to observe the elections 
of Year V in a passive capacity were now ordered to undertake a much more active role: they 
ǁĞƌĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƚŽ “ƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶǀĂƐƐĨŽƌǀŽƚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŝĨĂůůĞůƐĞĨĂŝůĞĚ ?ĨŽŵĞŶƚƐĐŚŝƐŵƐ ?
                                                          
66  ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZĂƉƉŽƌƚĨĂŝƚƉĂƌWŽŶƐ ?ĚĞsĞƌĚƵŶ ? ?ĂƵŶŽŵĚ ?ƵŶĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐƉĠĐŝĂůĞ ?ƐƵƌůĂ suppression des 
ůŝƐƚĞƐĚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƐ ? ? ? ?EŝǀƀƐĞzĞĂƌs/ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
67 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, p. 149. 
68 A.N., AF/III/498, plaquette 3138/2. 
49 
 
which would allow the government to annul whichever result, or results, seemed unfavourable.69 
This electoral campaigning was by no means the work of just the executive. After Fructidor the 
deputies in the Councils were just as eager to promote the moderate republican cause and they 
assisted the Directors by passing the raft of electoral laws required to legitimise, at least officially, 
the innovative techniques being employed.70 The elections of Year VI reveal a renewed sense of 
collaboration between the moderate republicans in the Councils, even as conflicts continued to 
arise between the two bodies in other areas. 
The evolution of the relationship between the executive and the legislative over the course 
of the Directory represents a novel and important development in the history of French 
republican democracy. Never before had France been governed by clearly delineated executive 
and elected legislative bodies. Later verdicts on the regime have typically been negative, seeing 
the regime as an abject failure largely on the basis of the perceived perversion and discarding of 
the Constitution of Year III on 18 Fructidor. Yet the very fact that the regime persisted for another 
3 years belies the short-sightedness of this assessment. The Second Directory did indeed abandon 
(in essence, if not explicitly) the idea, central to the Revolution since 1789, that government 
ought to be based on a foundational and sacrosanct document. When previous constitutions had 
been found lacking in the face of specific circumstances, they had been abandoned and replaced 
by hastily drafted new systems. These earlier efforts had been undertaken by men still filled with 
revolutionary optimism and idealism, who thought that a perfect model could emerge like a 
phoenix from the ashes of its failed predecessor. The men of the Directory, on the other hand, 
realised that this cycle of trial and error was never going to produce a perfect model. By 
transferring the basis of governance from the written constitution to a de facto system of co-
operation between the legislative and executive organs of government, the Directory 
simultaneously circumvented the impracticalities of the Constitution of 1795 and managed to 
preserve its own existence and continue its attempt to restore stability and order to revolutionary 
France. 
                                                          
69 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, pp. 147-148. 
70 See, for example, the various reforms of Ventôse, A.N., C//430/152-157. 
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While the dangers of this precedent have been well explored by historians, such as Howard 
ƌŽǁŶ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶƚƌĂĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌŽŽƚƐŽĨEĂƉŽůĞŽŶŽŶĂƉĂƌƚĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ŝƚ
would be wrong to present this development in a singularly negative light. In the minds of the 
Directors and deputies who carried out the coup of 18 Fructidor, they were acting out of a sincere 
interest of preserving a fragile democratic republic. Although the self-interest of their actions 
ought to be noted, we do these men a disservice if we cynically assert that all or even most of 
them put their own interests ahead of those of the republic. The coup was a revolutionary act, 
not only by overturning the Constitution but by establishing in its place an unprecedented model 
of parliamentary governance. While the drama of the coup of Fructidor has understandably 
drawn most of the attention of historians, it is in the relatively quiet period following it that we 
see the potential effectiveness of this new model. 
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Bicameralism in Action: Relations Between the Council of Five-
Hundred and the Council of Elders 
 
Both the introduction of bicameralism and the formation of an executive body outside of 
the ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞǁĞƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝĚĞĂƐŽĨŚŽǁ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ought to be structured, and created new layers of political interaction. The prevailing notion of 
national representation, established at the Estates General in 1789, was that the national 
deputies were representatives of the Nation as a unified whole, rather than specific sections of 
the population whether divided geographically, in the form of electorates, or ideologically, such 
as by subscribing to a nominal political party. Although the deputies were elected by 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ? ĞĂĐŚ ĚĞƉƵƚǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ŚĂĚ
elected them but rather every citizen of the entire Nation, in accordance with the definition of 
representation expressed by Sieyès and adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1789.1 It was 
this Nation that was ultimately sovereign, and thus was considered indivisible. The bicameral 
system of the Directory presented something of a paradox, then: the indivisible Nation was to be 
represented by a legislative body itself divided across two chambers. 
This chapter will seek to demonstrate how this paradox played out in the everyday 
functioning of the legislative councils. How did the deputies in the Corps Législatif envisage their 
respective roles in each of the councils? To what extent did the councils undermine or uphold 
the concept of the indivisibility of the sovereign Nation? By examining the daily interactions 
between the Council of Five-Hundred and the Council of Elders we can discover important shifts 
ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞĂƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĞůƉƐŚĂƉĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ĂƐ
well as points of tension where the inherent contradiction of a divided legislature attempting to 
represent a supposedly indivisible Nation became critical weaknesses in the Directorial regime. 
                                                          
1 Keith Baker is particularly enlightening about the way the deputies conceived of representation, notably the 
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ‘ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ?ŝŶ< ?D ?ĂŬĞƌ ?Inventing the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 224-251. 
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The parliamentarianism of the Directory was largely dictated by the Constitution of 1795. 
The framers of that constitution had been determined to prevent the new regime from sliding 
into the tyranny by assembly that had led to the downfall of the Convention. One of the primary 
ways they sought to avoid a similar fate for the Directory was to establish a rigid separation of 
powers. Montesquieu had famously outlined the three powers of government, executive, 
legislative, and judicial, and had warned against the unification of any two powers in the same 
person or body.2 For the Thermidorians, then, the Terror had been the result of unwisely placing 
executive power in the hands of the legislature; without an external executive to check its more 
ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ŝŵƉƵůƐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŚĂĚ ůĞĚ ? ĂƐ DŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ? ƚŽ  “ĂŶ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?
Montesquieu had further differentiated between particular parts of the legislative power, 
specifically that of the common people and that of the nobility. Each of these social orders, he 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ŚĂĚŝƚƐŽǁŶ “ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĞĂĐŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇŝƚƐ
own assembly.3 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶDŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ĞƌĞĚŝƚĂƌǇŶŽďŝůŝty were 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐƵƐĐĞƉƚŝďůĞƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?dŚĞŶŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
ƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ “ƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĂƚŽĨ
ƌĞƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƐĞŶor amend legislation, but only approve or reject 
proposals originating in the first, broader part of the legislature.4 
DŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ?ŝƐ ƋƵŝƚĞ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ
governmental institutions created for the new regime: the executive Directory, and the legislative 
Council of Five-Hundred and Council of Elders. Despite jointly forming the legislative branch and 
ĞǀĞŶƐŚĂƌŝŶŐĂũŽŝŶƚƚŝƚůĞĂƐƚŚĞ “Corps Législatif ? ?ƚŚĞƚǁŽĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐǁĞƌĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚďǇĂŶĂƌƌĂǇŽĨ
measures enshrined in the constitution. These measures ranged from those dictating the specific 
powers each council would hold, through to the specifics of how their deliberations could take 
place or how they were to communicate with each other. 
                                                          
2 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book XI, Chapter VI, in Montesquieu, Baron de, The Complete Works of M. de 
Montesquieu, (London: 1777), vol. 1, pp. 198-199. 




Undoubtedly the two most important of these measures were firstly, the stipulation in 
Article 76 of the constitution that only the Council of Five-Hundred had the power to initiate 
legislation, and secondly, that of Article 95 which prohibited the Council of Elders from making 
amendments to any legislation.5 Together, these two articles set the balance of power in the 
Corps Législatif drastically in the favour of the Council of Five-Hundred. The Council of Elders was 
relegated to a purely obstructionist position of the sort envisaged by Montesquieu, able only to 
reject or pass the resolutions sent to them by the Five-Hundred; although, as we have seen, the 
dŚĞƌŵŝĚŽƌŝĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůƚŽĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨůĚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵDŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ
upper chamber consisting of the nobility. 
The framers of the constitution found this arrangement attractive for more than just 
DŽŶƚĞƐƋƵŝĞƵ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? dŚĞƌĞ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ Ă ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ƐůŽǁ
down the passage of legislation and to imbue the entire legislative process with a sober 
solemnity, in order to encourage political stability. A key element of the Thermidorian narrative 
was that the downfall of the Convention was in part due to the feverishness of its proceedings, 
as the more fiery and populist deputies overwhelmed by threats and haste those who preferred 
prudent reflection, especially at moments of crisis when caution and level-headedness would 
have been most valuable. According to this narrative, it was the lack of such restraint that had 
led the deputies to run headlong into the fire of populism and Terror. One of the key framers of 
ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ŽŝƐƐǇĚ ?ŶŐůĂƐ ?ŚĂĚĞŶĚƵƌĞĚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀŝǀŝĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨǁŚĞƌĞ
such unbridled populism could lead during the uprising of 1 Prairial (20 May), Year III, when a 
mob invaded the Convention and murdered a deputy, Féraud, before presenting his head on a 
ƉŝŬĞĂŶĚĨŽƌĐŝŶŐŽŝƐƐǇĚ ?ŶŐůĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞŵďůǇĂƚ ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ƚŽŐƌĞĞƚŚŝƐƐůĂŝŶ
colleague. The trauma of this event no doubt influenced his views when drafting the constitution, 
work which was taking place through the time of the Prairial uprising. When presenting the 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶ  ?dŚĞƌŵŝĚŽƌ  ? ? ? :ƵůǇ ?ŽŝƐƐǇĚ ?ŶŐůĂƐƐƉŽŬĞǁŝƚŚ
passion, strongly denouncing the radicalism and violence that had pervaded the Convention and 
                                                          




had led to events such as those of Prairial.6 At the same time, he lauded the virtues of prudence 
and patience in law-making, arguing that instead of the mad rush of the Jacobin Convention, the 
pace of the legislature in the new regime ought to be closer to that of a plodding march.7 
This desire for a slow but steady legislative process was a key reason for the creation of a 
bicameral legislature, and specifically for the curious division of powers between the two 
councils. Unlike the United Kingdom, where the House of Commons and House of Lords were 
divided along class lines and the latter was intended to be a house of review with powers of 
initiation and amendment, or the United States, where the Senate was designed to represent 
state interests, the legislative councils of the Directory were intended to embody both the 
innovative genius and the experienced wisdom of the fledgling French Republic. This is made 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ŽŝƐƐǇ Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚion of the draft of the Constitution of 1795 to the 
Convention. Firstly, he clarifies the nature of the councils in contrast to those of other bicameral 
systems. The two councils of the Directory would be elected by the people (as opposed to 
inheriting their positions) simultaneously and for identical terms. They would be different from 
ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŽŶůǇ  “ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?8 Secondly, he idealises the two 
councils as the mind of the republic. The Council of Five-Hundred, being larger and consisting of 
ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞ “ƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƐŽƚŽƐƉĞĂŬ ?ƚŚĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?9 It 
was intended to be a creative cauldron of ideas where the spark of political genius could flourish 
and give rise to brilliant new legislation. Part of the reason it would be free to be so creative was 
that it could rely on the more measured Council of Elders to overrule any legislation that got 
ŽǀĞƌůǇŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƚŽ “ŚĂǀĞŶŽŽƚŚĞƌĚƵƚǇƚŚĂŶƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞǁŝƚŚǁŝƐĚŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ
laws to adopƚĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚůĂǁƐƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚ ?ŶĞǀĞƌŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƉƌŽƉŽƐĞůĂǁƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ ? ?10 In 
ƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
check where necessary.11  
                                                          
6  ‘ŝƐĐŽƵƌƐƉƌĠůŝŵŝŶĂŝƌĞĂƵƉƌŽũĞƚĚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƉŽƵƌůĂZĠƉƵďůŝƋƵĞĨƌĂŶĕĂŝƐĞ ?ƉƌŽŶŽŶĐĠƉĂƌŽŝƐƐǇ-Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ ?ĂƵ
ŶŽŵĚĞůĂĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĚĞƐKŶǌĞ ? ?ŝŶdƌŽƉĞƌ ?Terminer la Révolution, pp. 277-305. 
7 ibid. 






Described in this idealised way, the arrangement of the two councils appears rather 
ďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ?ŚĂƐůŽŶŐďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨ “ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ǁŚŽ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ĨĂƌ ƚŽŽ ŵƵĐŚ ƚƌƵƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
plan.12 Was the elegant legislativĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞůĂŝĚŽƵƚďǇŽŝƐƐǇĚ ?ŶŐůĂƐŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ
this overly abstract theorising which quickly fell to pieces when applied to the reality of 
revolutionary France? Was the Council of Elders effective in slowing the pace of political change 
while still allowing the still-young French republic to develop and grow, or did it simply devolve 
into either an ineffective rubber stamp or an obstructionist nightmare? On the other hand, how 
respectful of the Elders was the Council of Five-Hundred, which with its superior numbers and 
ƉŽǁĞƌŽĨůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƐƚŝůůǁŝĞůĚĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐůŽƵƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐ ?ƐŝŶŐůĞ
power of veto in the event of an impasse? In order to make such judgements it will be necessary 
to survey the practices of the Corps Législatif and analyse to what extent Directorial bicameralism 
actually embodied the intentions of the framers of the Constitution of 1795. 
A particularly interesting feature of the Constitution of 1795 is the attention it gave to 
communication between the three bodies of government: The Council of Five-Hundred, the 
Council of Elders, and the executive Directory. Most notably, each of the of these bodies was to 
appoint four official Messengers of State, who were to carry any and all messages between the 
three.13 Each messenger was to be preceded by two hussars, in part for security but also in part 
to evoke the pomp and dignity that was intended to clothe the legislative process under the 
Directory. Indeed, the importance given to ceremony in the relationship between the two 
councils is a topic that will reappear. The flow of official messages carried by these Messengers 
of State between the two councils was very unbalanced, however. The Council of Five-Hundred 
was by far the more communicative of the two councils, although that was understandable since 
it held the initiative. In fact, the vast majority of documents sent from the Five-Hundred to the 
                                                          
12 M. Lyons, France Under the Directory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 19. This standard 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ' ?>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ? ‘>ĂŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĚĞů ?ĂŶ/// ? ?Les thermidoriens - Le Directoire, (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 2016). 
13 Constitution of 1795, Article 125 & Article 170, in Troper, Terminer la Révolution, pp. 723 & 727. 
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Elders were resolutions for new laws, and so it will be beneficial to come to a better 
understanding of the legislative process under the Directory. 
The process of creating a law according to the Constitution of 1795 was a long, laborious 
process. This was to be expected, given the desire of its framers to slow the process down, yet 
the specific details can still be somewhat bewildering in their strictness. Under normal 
circumstances, it took a minimum of thirty days (an entire month under the revolutionary 
calendar) to create a law.14 First, a proposal had to be made in the Council of Five-Hundred and 
presented for discussion. No fewer than ten days after the first reading, the proposal had to be 
read a second time, followed by another ten-day waiting period before the third and final 
reading. After the third reading the Five-Hundred could proceed to a vote, and if accepted the 
proposal then became a resolution and was sent to the Council of Elders for approval or rejection. 
Despite the fact that the Elders could make no amendments, each resolution nevertheless 
required another three readings in the second Council, this time separated by a five-day waiting 
period each time. Finally, once approved by the Elders a resolution became known as a law, and 
was sent to the executive Directory for promulgation no more than two days after they received 
it. This risked creating a situation where legislation could quickly pile up, the deputies, particularly 
those in the Council of Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚ ?ďĞŝŶŐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉĂůŵŽƐƚĂŵŽŶƚŚ ?ƐǁŽƌƚŚŽĨƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ
straight in their minds. 
In practice, both councils utilised special commissions to great effect in managing their 
workload. In the Council of Five-Hundred these special commissions were the main generators 
of proposals. Any time a particular issue was raised, either by a deputy or, as was frequently the 
case, by a message received from executive Directory or other external source, that the council 
felt required legislation, a commission, usually of three to five deputies, would be formed to draft 
a proposal. Similarly, in the Council of Elders every resolution received from the Five-Hundred 
was assigned to a small commission, which would then report back to the council with a 
recommendation to approve or reject the resolution. Many of the proposals or resolutions 
received little debate in the full assembly, the work of the commissions being given a brief 
                                                          
14 Constitution of 1795, Articles 77, 91 & 128, in Troper, Terminer la Révolution, pp. 719-720 & 723. 
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verification before ushering the proposed law along the lengthy legislative process. This was 
especially the case in the Council of Elders, where deputies could not add or remove articles to a 
resolution and so were, in principle, only able to express dissatisfaction with specific elements by 
rejecting the entire resolution. In practice, deputies in the Council of Elders did have ways of 
expressing their views on the specifics of legislation to the Council of Five-Hundred, whether by 
messages sent directly to the council (although these were surprisingly rare), by having their 
views noted in the procès-verbaux of the sessions and which were then published in Le Moniteur, 
or by delivering an eloquent enough discourse in the council that it was printed and distributed. 
/Ŷ ƌƵŵĂŝƌĞ ? zĞĂƌ s/ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĞĚĞůĂǇ Ě ?ŐŝĞƌ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůĚĞƌƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƌĞũĞĐƚ Ă
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? “ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨ&ŝǀĞ-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚ ?ďǇĂŶĞǁƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĐĂŶĨŝǆƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐ ?
that he had outlined in it.15 
While commissions were effective at streamlining the legislative process, the output of the 
Corps Législatif was in fact significantly lower than that of earlier regimes. On the second 
anniversary of the installation of the Directory, which also happened to mark almost precisely 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛ ŵŝĚ-point, deputy Darracq in the Five-Hundred rose to lament the way that 
legislation had multiplied over the course of the Revolution.16 By his count, the Constituent 
Assembly had given 3,488 laws to France over its two-year existence; the Legislative Assembly, 
2,190 over the course of a single year; and the Convention, from 1792 to 1795, had provided 
15,414.17 By contrast, the first two years of the Directory had generated only 1,139 new laws. It 
is worth noting that Darracq was speaking prior to the elections of the Year VI, when the Corps 
Législatif began verifying the operations of electoral assemblies at all levels of government and 
thus tremendously increased the number of laws it was creating. Prior to that development, 
however, it appears that the desire of the framers of the Constitution of 1795 to restrict the pace 
of legislation and to encourage measured lawmaking, tempered by reflection over an extended 
period of time, was being largely realised. 
                                                          
15 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Brumaire an VI, No. 179, pp. 164. 
16 ibid., pp. 165-166. 
17 Ibid., p. 165. 
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Yet despite this desire, the framers of the Constitution included a provision for expediting 
the process. Article 81 of the constitution stated that the usual form of three readings in each 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ  “ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ ƵƌŐĞŶƚ ďǇ Ă ƉƌĞĐĞĚing 
declaration by the Council of Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚ ? ?18 dŚŝƐ ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶ  “ĂĐƚĞ Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ ? ǁĂƐ ƚŽ
outline the cause for the urgency and, if the proposal was successful, was to be included in the 
preamble of the resulting resolution. When presented with a resolution carrying an acte 
Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ, the Council of Elders was to decide whether or not to accept the stated reasoning for 
ignoring the normal procedures. If the council agreed with it then they, too, could ignore their 
usual procedures and deliberate immediately on the approval or rejection of the resolution. Here 
lay a small but important caveat, however, that if the Council of Elders rejected the motive for 
urgency then they could not deliberate on the main content of the attached resolution. Finally, 
any laws which had been declared urgent by the Five-Hundred and accepted as such by the Elders 
were to be promulgated by the Directory immediately. In theory, then, an ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ could 
enable a law to be passed within a single day, although in reality such speediness was an 
impossibility. 
Faced with the drawn out legislative procedure prescribed for normal circumstances, the 
councils were swift to take advantage of this shortcut. From the earliest days of the Directory, 
the Council of Five-Hundred attached an ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞto the majority of their resolutions, and 
that habit continued unabated throughout the period, irrespective of coups or changes in the 
membership of the councils.19 To take an example from the middle of the Directorial period, of 
the twenty laws enacted between 12 and 28 Vendémiaire, Year VI, only one was passed by the 
so-called normal procedure of three readings in each council.20 The other nineteen were all, for 
one reason or another, declared urgent. Nor was this an atypical month, despite the fact that it 
immediately followed the coup of 18 Fructidor, a period when urgency might be expected to be 
more prevalent as the councils quickly attempted to reassert their authority. The output of laws 
increased dramatically once the Corps Législatif began verifying electoral assemblies, but if those 
                                                          
18 Constitution of 1795, Article 81, in Troper, Terminer la Révolution, p. 719. 
19 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Frimaire an IV, No. 31, pp. 95-100. 
20 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Brumaire an VI, No. 176, pp. 113-128. 
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laws of verification (which were invariably deemed urgent) are put to one side then even in the 
comparatively calm period of Pluviôse, Year VII, again only one out of twenty-one laws was 
unaccompanied by an ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ.21 
At every point in the life of the councils, the ĂĐƚĞƐĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ were a central feature of their 
operations. At first glance this seems like a blatant disregard for the intent of the constitution. 
Surely it could not be the case that virtually all resolutions emerging from the Five-Hundred were 
genuinely so urgent that they necessitated forgoing the standard procedure set forth by the 
constitution. A closer inspection of the motivations for these ĂĐƚĞƐ Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ reveals several 
significant aspects of parliamentary practice during the Directory, and in particular sheds light on 
the nature of the relationship between the Council of Five-Hundred and the Council of Elders. 
The reasons given for the ĂĐƚĞƐĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ cover an enormous range. Given that the vast 
majority of the laws passed by the Corps Législatif were accompanied by an ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ, the 
deputies became quite skilled at wording their motivations in such a way that virtually any 
conceivable circumstance could be portrayed as urgent. It can thus be difficult at times to 
determine whether the urgency was legitimate, or if the deputies had a more surreptitious 
motive. At the simpler end of the spectrum were resolutions that were deemed urgent due to 
practical limitations. These included those bound by a specific deadline, such as last minute 
amendments to plans for key festivals, such as the fête de la souveraineté22 or, from Year VI 
onwards, celebrations marking the anniversary of the coup of 18 Fructidor.23 Such resolutions 
may have indicated a certain lack of foresight on the part of the deputies, but otherwise this 
seems like a reasonable occasion in which to expedite the legislative process. Similarly, the Corps 
Législatif frequently received requests, generally via the executive Directory, for assistance to 
ensure the well-being of citizens. These requests might come from certain categories of people, 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ŽĨ  ? ? &ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌ ? zĞĂƌs ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ?  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ƵƌŐĞŶƚůǇ
necessary to provide the means to ensure the subsistence of a great number of officers who, by 
                                                          
21 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Ventôse an VII, No. 306, pp. 313-320; No. 315, pp. 441-448; No. 
318, p. 473. 
22 A.N. C//536/123, Séance du 7 Thermidor. 
23 A.N. C//537/136, Séance du 2 Fructidor. 
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their age, wounds, or illness, have ďĞĞŶĚĞĞŵĞĚƵŶĨŝƚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ ? ?24 
Alternatively they could come from a particular department or town. Take, for example, the case 
of the town of Jouvence, north of Lyon, which lacked sufficient funds to repair its main well after 
it had been damaged during the winter of 1798-1799.25 Having had no success applying for 
assistance from the department, the town had petitioned the Corps Législatif directly, complete 
with a repayment scheme. Both councils recognised the need for such repaiƌƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇƐŝŶĐĞ “ƚŚĞ
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ :ŽƵǀĞŶĐĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ŚĂƌŵĨƵů ? ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŚĞ ůŽĂŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞůƉ ŽĨ ĂŶ acte 
Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ. By contrast, only two weeks later an almost identical request for financial assistance 
to repair a well, this time from the town of Morangles, north of Paris, was approved by the Five-
Hundred but rejected by the Elders.26 Here the Elders initially approved the ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ on 
the same grounds as they had for Jouvence, yet refused the loan because they were unconvinced 
that the township had made sufficient inquiries for assistance from the municipal administration 
before approaching the Directory.27 While a relatively minor difference, the contrast between 
ƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵed to take 
seriously their constitutional duty to treat the ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞseparately to the main body of a 
resolution. 
Another reason frequently given for ĂĐƚĞƐĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ was that the given resolution was vital 
to the stability and proper functioning of the state. This type of motivation is particularly 
prevalent in two key areas: firstly, among laws concerning finances, which were controlled by the 
Council of Five-Hundred; and secondly among those reviewing electoral assemblies. Both of 
these categories provide fascinating insights to the dynamics between the two legislative 
councils. Major budgetary resolutions were among the densest pieces of legislation to pass 
through the Corps Législatif, and it was reasonable to expedite their passage in the interest of 
ensuring supply for the government. The resolution outlining the expenses of the Directory for 
the Year VI, for instance, was preceded by a declaration of urgency that was as long as some 
                                                          
24 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Vendémiaire an VI, No. 148, p. 134. 
25 A.N. C//561/302, Résolution concernant l'autorisation donnée aux habitants de la commune de Jouvence 
(Saône-et-Loire) de prélever sur eux-mêmes une contribution pour les frais de réparations de la fontaine publique; 
and A.N. C//561/301, Séance du 5 Ventôse an VII. 




entire resolutions, but which essentially stated that it was of ƉƌŝŵĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ “ĂƐ
ĞĂƌůǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐǇĞĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ
ĨƵƚƵƌĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƐďǇĂ “ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞůĂǁ ? ?28 However, the sheer length and detail of such resolutions 
created a dilemma for the Elders. Would they prioritise the necessity of a prompt decision implied 
by the ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ, or would they instead play their role as the brake on legislation and take 
whatever time they needed to properly analyse and debate the resolution?  
Invariably when it came to major financial resolutions the Elders chose the latter. A closer 
look at the passage of laws relating to government finances reveals that despite the application 
of an ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ, they often took just as long to be approved as they would have without 
one. For example, on 8 Fructidor Year VI the Five-Hundred passed a resolution governing the 
budget for the upcoming Year VII.29 This resolution was accompanied by a short ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ 
ǁŚŝĐŚƐŝŵƉůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐĚĞŵands that the revenue required for 
ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨzĞĂƌ ?ďĞƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇĨŝǆĞĚ ? ?30 Yet it was not until 26 Fructidor that the Elders finally 
approved the resolution. It had been presented at the session on 9 Fructidor, where the acte 
Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞwas immediately approved and a special commission formed in order to examine the 
resolution more thoroughly.31 This commission then reported back to the council on 18 Fructidor 
ƚŽĂƉƉƌŝƐĞƚŚĞĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?
in the absence of an ĂĐƚĞ Ě ?urgence, would have been required under the constitution. The 
commission returned to its work until 26 Fructidor, when one of its members, Arnould, gave a 
final, lengthy report to the council that concluded that despite several minor concerns, the 
resolution ought to be approved.32 The resolution had then spent eighteen days in the hands of 
the Elders, being introduced to the deputies three times, with at least five days between each 
reading, just as required by the constitution for non-urgent resolutions. This extended and 
measured procedure was typical of the way the Council of Elders approached larger pieces of 
                                                          
28 A.N. C/I/146, Séance du 16 Brumaire, an VI. 
29 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Fructidor VI, No. 102, pp. 145-147. 
30 ibid., p. 145. 
31 A.N. C//537/137, Séance du 9 Fructidor, an VI. 
32 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Fructidor VI, No. 122, pp. 455-464. 
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legislation. In such cases, rather than being a shortcut around some of the more restrictive 
aspects of the Constitution  
It is true that budgetary resolutions of this kind did carry a deadline, specifically the first 
day of the new year, 1 Vendémiaire. As such, the fact that the final discussion of the resolution 
in the Elders was taking place a mere ten days before that deadline left little time to request 
amendments from the Five-Hundred. Interestingly, though, that is precisely what one deputy, 
>ĞŶŐůĞƚ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĚŽ ?ZŝƐŝŶŐƚŽƐƉĞĂŬĂĨƚĞƌƌŶŽƵůĚ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?>ĞŶŐůĞƚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ
 “ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŚĂĚĚŽŶĞŝŶĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƚŚĞ
resolution, but nevertheless felt that one particular article would be improved significantly by 
ƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ “indirecte et du même nature ?  ?ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŝŶ
reference to types of extra taxes that could be applied if the standard sources of income proved 
insufficient to meet the 600 million specified at the start of the resolution.33 He was quick to 
recognise that such an amendment could not be made by the Elders, as they were bound to 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ “ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?those men from whom no 
ũƵƐƚŝĚĞĂĞƐĐĂƉĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŽŵŶŽŐƌĂŶĚŝĚĞĂĐŽƵůĚĨƌŝŐŚƚĞŶ ? ?34 Yet, he argued, such a minor change 
could be made by the Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚĂŶĚƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐ “ŝŶůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚŚƌĞĞĚĂǇƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽ




archival evidence, we can make a reasonable guess. The deputies likely saw it as simply too minor 
a quibble to worry about, and felt it would be a waste of time to go through the entire process 
again, even if expedited. They had, after all, just sat through a third reading of a particularly dry 
resolution, along with a detailed analysis of its minutiae, and the prospect of hearing it again in 
ŝƚƐĞŶƚŝƌĞƚǇŵŝŶƵƐĂŵĞƌĞĨŝǀĞǁŽƌĚƐǁĂƐůŝŬĞůǇŶŽƚĂŶĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?>ĞŶŐůĞƚ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨ
that the amendment could be made within three days was likely optimistic, since restarting the 
                                                          





entire process could open the resolution up to all sorts of other minor criticisms that could derail 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ>ĞŶŐůĞƚ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶũƵƐƚified but it would 
not be an issue until well into the following year, by which time, if it was really necessary, an 
amendment could be passed to rectify the issue. Such amendments were not uncommon, and 
were used to correct errors or clarify the meaning in the wording or printing of laws, such as that 
of 21 Vendémiaire, Year VIII, which corrected several figures in a law of the 4 Complementary 
Day of Year VII which determined the salaries of certain soldiers, and also clarified the wording 
in a different law from the previous Fructidor.36 Similarly, in Brumaire VI the Elders were 
presented with a resolution that one deputy acknowledged quite openly was flawed, but argued 
that it should be approved while also notifying the Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ? “Ɛo that they 
ǁŝůů ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ Ă ƌĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ ŽĨ Ă ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ůĂǁ ? ?37 Precisely this sort of 
rectifying law could have made the adjustment Lenglet sought, though since now such law exists, 
his critique was evidently deemed inconsequential. 
AlthŽƵŐŚ >ĞŶŐůĞƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ Ă ŵŝŶŽƌ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇůĂǁ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐĂĚĚƚŽŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďƚůĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞůĚĞƌƐ ?
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƚĂƐŬĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞCorps Législatif. The Elders were acutely conscious 
of the need to balance their role as the brake in the legislative process with the expediency 
demanded by the uncertain political reality of the French Revolution. In this one example, we 
find the Elders essentially ignoring, or at least putting to one side, the ĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ in favour of 
a slower, more careful handling of the resolution. Yet at the same time, they are willing to 
overlook certain problems in the interest of facilitating a functional and productive legislature. 
They were evidently wary of devolving into the frustratingly obstructionist entity that detractors 
of the Constitution of 1795 always feared it would, but were also determined not to neglect their 
duty to the Constitution of holding the Five-Hundred to account. 
While such budgetary resolutions provide an example of the Elders largely managing this 
balance well, the evidence from the resolutions surrounding the verification of electoral 
assemblies reveals quite a different story. The elections of Years V, VI, and VII were unlike any 
                                                          
36 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Brumaire an VIII, No. 187, pp. 374-375. 
37 Journal des débats et des lois du Corps Législatif, Brumaire an VII, No. 177, p. 106. 
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France had previously experienced, due to the extensive reforms to the electoral introduced by 
the Constitution of 1795.38 In particular, the increasingly well-co-ordinated electoral campaigning 
both by the government, notably through the use of commissaires du Directoire exécutif to 
organise local campaigns, and by factions on the left and right was an unprecedented move 
towards modern representative democracy.39 However, it also meant that, in the absence of an 
overwhelming turnout, concerted anti-Directory minorities were capable of achieving great 
success in the primary and electoral assemblies. In the Year V, for example, the councils had failed 
to take the initiative and were taken by surprise by the royalist success, which ultimately led to 
the coup of Fructidor. By the time the next electoral cycle came around in the Year VI it had 
become clear that radical democrats were likely to stage a similar upset, and so, as a means of 
defending themselves against such results, the councils declared that they would verify the 
results of the electoral assemblies. Ostensibly this was to ensure that the assemblies were 
conforming to the constitution, but had the convenient effect of allowing the councils to annul 
unfavourable results. The fact that in areas with particularly strong anti-Directory sentiment the 
government had encouraged scissions, or break-away electoral assemblies which could compete 
for legitimacy with the original assembly, greatly aided the deputies in their verification efforts, 
essentially enabling them to choose their preferred candidate or giving them an excuse to 
outright annul the results for a department.40 These scissions had the drawback, however, of 
greatly increasing the number of electoral results that required verification, which meant that 
the deputies were hard pressed to complete them before the new deputies took their seats, 
verified or not, on 1 Prairial. 
Ultimately, the relationship between the two councils was not the rational, idealistic 
balance of imagination anĚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŝƐƐǇ Ě ?ŶŐůĂƐ ŚĂĚ ĂƐƉŝƌĞĚ ƚŽ ? zĞƚ ŶŽƌ ǁĂƐ ŝƚ ĂƐ
dysfunctional and incompetent as its many detractors over the past two centuries have claimed. 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝůĞŶŽƚĂŶŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŚĂĚŽƵƚůĂƐƚĞĚďŽƚŚ
                                                          
38 See Patrice Gueniffey, La Nombre et la Raison ? ‘ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƚŝƚůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶd Malcolm Crook, Elections in the French 
Revolution ? ‘WĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐĐŚŝƐŵƐĂŶĚƉƵƌŐĞƐ PůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌ ĐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ PĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ
University Press, 1996) for more on these reforms and their importance in shaping the political culture and legacy 
of the Directory. 
39 Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, pp. 147-149. 
40 ibid., p. 149. 
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its republican predecessor in the Convention and the short-lived constitutional monarchy of 
1791. If the rate of legislation did not slow to the crawling pace suggested in the Constitution of 
1795, thanks to the frequent use of ĂĐƚĞƐ Ě ?ƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ, the Council of Elders nevertheless 
functioned effectively as a brake on the legislative machine, through judicious use of its right to 
veto. Yet at the same time the deputies recognised the necessity of being able to react to 
situations and emergencies swiftly, especially when facing the continuing social turmoil of 
revolutionary France. They thus took it upon themselves to create a balance between the 
constitutional call to measured governance and the need to be able to act swiftly when it was 
required of them. This left them hovering uncertainly between full commitment to the 
constitution on one side and cold, bureaucratic pragmatism on the other. That precarious 
position was not sustainable, and 18 Brumaire saw the fall of an undoubtedly flawed system. 
However, as an experiment in parliamentary politics it is remarkable more for its successes in the 
face of profound adversity than for its failures. The Council of Five-Hundred and the Council of 
Elders had managed to prove to France that bicameralism was not only feasible, but desirable. 
The Directorial system may have passed away without much regret in Brumaire Year VIII, but it 
left a legacy that would resonate throughout eighteenth-century French politics. 
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The Role of Commissions in the Legislative Councils of the Directory 
 
The creation of the committee system was one of the most significant political innovations 
of the French Revolution, and one with an important legacy for modern European 
parliamentarianism. Despite lacking the grandeur of a written constitution or the salience of 
elections on a national scale, this humble organisational development was fundamental to the 
day-to-day operations of early French democracy. It was the model by which every parliamentary 
assembly had conducted its business, from the National Constituent Assembly through to the 
Convention. Tim Tackett, in his assessment of the National Assembly goes so far as to argue that 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐ “ƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĂƚ
body.1 By the time of the Convention committees had acquired such a prominent position in the 
governance of France that executive power was wielded de facto by a two governmental 
committees within the legislature, the Committee for General Security and the Committee of 
Public Safety.2 So powerful were these committees that the Thermidorian Reaction against 
Robespierre and the Jacobins in July 1794 was as much a reaction against the tyranny of the 
legislature by a cabal of committee members as it was against the specific policies of the Terror. 
This goes some way to explain a curious feature of the Constitution of 1795, namely Article 
Sixty-Seven. Part of the section on the legislative power, this article reads,  
 “EĞŝƚŚĞƌŽƵŶĐŝůŵĂǇĐƌeate within itself any permanent committee. Each Council has 
only the option, when a matter seems to merit a preparatory examination, of 
nominating from among its members a special commission, which will address only 
the object of its formation. This commission is dissolved as soon as the Council has 
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ? ?3 
                                                          
1 T. Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the emergence of a 
revolutionary culture (1789-90), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 219. 
2 J. Godechot, >ĞƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĚĞůĂ&ƌĂŶĐĞƉĞŶĚĂŶƚůĂZĠǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĞƚů ?ŵƉŝƌĞ, 3rd Edition, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1985), pp. 304-314. 
3 Constitution of 1795, Article Sixty-Seven, in M. Troper, Terminer la Révolution, (Paris: Fayard, 2006), Annexe 8. 
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The significance of this shift in parliamentary practice cannot be overstated. Although 
committees were not outright prohibited, the proscription of standing committees represented 
a departure from the central format of the fledgling French parliamentary system. The 
experience acquired over five years of parliamentarianism was discarded while no advice 
regarding an alternative model was provided by the constitution. The present chapter will 
investigate the implications of this shift. In order to contextualise the ban on permanent 
committees, and to emphasize its significance, the chapter will begin with a brief overview of the 
development of the committee system in 1789 and its importance in the assemblies preceding 
those of the Directory. The many questions raised by the introduction of Article 67 will then be 
explored. If the fear of committees tyrannising the legislature truly lay behind the move, why was 
a proscription of permanent committees chosen rather than instituting some form of oversight 
and accountability? How did the legislature proceed with its business in the absence of 
permanent committees to which the bulk of work could be delegated? More precisely, in what 
ways were the deputies guided by their prior experiences of parliamentary politics and what 
novel features, if any, did they invent? How did this new parliamentary model fit into the 
bicameral system? And, of course, did the Councils actually obey Article Sixty-Seven, or were they 
tempted to revert to old forms either by establishing secret committees or by exploiting the 
several vagaries in the wording of the constitution? By understanding the role of committees in 
the councils of the Directory, we will be able to paint a more colourful and clearly defined portrait 
of early French parliamentary practice. 
The committee system was not a planned aspect of revolutionary parliamentary 
organisation. France had very limited experience of parliamentary politics, which posed a 
significant challenge to the deputies of the National Assembly, who were essentially trying to 
create a new system from scratch. Indeed, these deputies had arrived at Versailles with no clear 
intention of overturning the political structures of the Old Regime, but rather represented a vast 
range of agendas and aspirations.4 While the dissolution of the Estates General into the National 
Assembly appears at first glance to have represented a unification of ambitions, at least on the 
                                                          
4 A. Castaldo, Les Méthodes de Travail de la Constituante, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), pp. 57-58. 
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part of the deputies of the Third Estate (signified perhaps by the Tennis Court Oath with its 
solitary dissenter), in actuality the differences in opinion between deputies were intensified. In 
this environment of uncertainty and division, coupled with their awareness of the need to act 
quickly, the deputies of the National Assembly were forced to organise themselves in new ways 
simply to handle the immense task they had set themselves. As just one of the organisational 
experiments developed by the deputies, albeit the most successful, the committee system was 
in fact a response to exigent circumstances and a shortage of time, but would become an 
essential feature of French parliamentary politics. 
The ostensible aim of the National Assembly when it emerged out of the Estates General 
in June was to write and establish a constitution for France, a seemingly singular purpose. Yet as 
the summer of 1789 drew on, it was the divisions between deputies, rather than their 
commonalities, that became increasingly evident. The tension between the monarchiens and 
their rivals was particularly pronounced and resulted in many intense conflicts during the 
constitutional debates of August and September.5 However, most of the difficulties facing the 
National Assembly did not manifest themselves as clearly-defined partisan divisions. Rather the 
deputies found themselves in the midst of an identity crisis. Beyond desiring a constitution, the 
deputies could not seem to agree on anything. This was in part due to the unusual and 
ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ?ƐdĂĐŬĞƚƚƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ?  “ƚŚĞŵĞŶŽĨ  ? ? ?
found themselves in the midst of an unusually fluid situation, in which all traditional political 
values were being put into question, in which the very boundaries and definitions of sovereignty 
were continually in flux, in which their own conceptions of themselves could be transformed 
ĚĂŝůǇ ? ?6 This sense of fluidity and lack of definition was only exacerbated by the revolutionary 
events outside of the Assembly, such as the storming of the Bastille or the October Days, which 
gave the deputies good reason to fear that if they did not succeed in giving the impression that 
they were making steady progress, they ran the risk of losing control of the revolution. 
The deputies recognised the need to organise themselves in such a way that individual 
tensions or disagreements would not hold up the decision-making process unnecessarily, and 
                                                          
5 J. Egret, La Révolution des Notables, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1950), pp. 131-159. 
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that would enable the Assembly to address the ever-growing list of governmental issues 
threatening to distract them from their primary task of writing a constitution. The main assembly 
alone was clearly not equipped for the task; the sheer size of the assembly, both in terms of the 
number of deputies and in the physical space of the meeting hall (which, after the National 
Assembly moved to Paris, was the Manège, or riding school of the Tuileries Palace), meant that 
the vast majority of deputies felt unable to participate. The deputies experimented with a 
number of organisational ideas, beginning with a system of bureaux. This system divided the 
main assembly into smaller groups (initially of 30 members, growing to 40 with the addition of 
deputies from the First and Second Estates), each of which would meet separately to discuss the 
same topics.7 This enabled greater participation, especially by those deputies who felt, due to 
lack of either vocal power or confidence, incapable of voicing an opinion in the main assembly. 
Membership of these bureaux was changed on a monthly basis, with the intention that over time 
each deputy would have the opportunity to engage with every other deputy while also avoiding 
the emergence of any particularly dominant group. Many deputies thoroughly appreciated the 
more intimate environment provided by these small group discussions, while others, such as 
Mounier, felt that having all the bureaux discussing the same issues separately was a wise 
precaution against rash decision-making.8 
However, precisely that obstruction to hasty deliberation was the downfall of the bureaux. 
While the small group format was clearly a desirable one, facilitating as it did more fruitful 
discussion and enabling more deputies to participate, the redundancy of having multiple debates 
on each issue was too costly a luxury for the time-pressed National Assembly. What was needed 
was a system almost precisely opposite that of the bureaux, one which would streamline 
discussion and decision making. The most pressing issue facing the National Assembly, the 
development of a constitution, offered the perfect opportunity to put a new format to the test, 
in which a select group of deputies considered particularly knowledgeable about a certain area 
would be assigned to work on that field and prepare a project on which the Assembly as a whole 
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could deliberate.9 This model had already been explored in June 1789 to tackle several immediate 
issues of organisation, although each had only a brief existence. These early experiments were 
followed in July by the first Committee of the Constitution, of which Mounier (despite being 
devoted to the bureau system) was made a leading member. 
tŚŝůĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ďǇ DŽƵŶŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ĨĞůůŽǁ
monarchiens, were thoroughly defeated when put to a vote in September,10 the underlying 
system was deemed a success. A new Committee of the Constitution was created to replace the 
shattered original, and the number of other committees rose rapidly. By February 1790 there 
were around 25 permanent committees working within the National Assembly.11 
From these haphazard origins, emerging from an experiment in response to exigent 
circumstances, the committee system swiftly became thoroughly ingrained in the assemblies of 
revolutionary France. Indeed, committees provided significant continuity across the early 
regimes of revolutionary France. They remained central to the operations of the Legislative 
Assembly, which inherited many of the committees of the National Assembly in spite of the self-
denying clause the deputies of the latter placed on themselves.12 However, it was under the 
Convention that committees reached their greatest importance. After the fall of the monarchy 
the executive powers of government were absorbed by the legislature, and in the newly-formed 
Convention these powers were wielded by a number of increasingly powerful committees. Most 
notable among these were the Committee of General Security and the Committee of Public 
Safety. Godechot traces the origins of the former of these back to the Committee of Intelligence 
in the National Assembly, ǀŝĂƚŚĞ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨ^ƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞ ?13 As it grew in power 
from the beginning of the Convention the Girondins attempted to curb its influence, such as by 
establishing the Commission of Twelve as a rival body. However, the fall of the Girondins 
                                                          
9 Castaldo, Les Méthodes de Travail de la Constituante, pp. 205-207. 
10 Archives Parlementaires (AP), Premier Série, Vol. 8, pp. 605-612. 
11 Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, pp. 222-223. 
12 C.J. Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly of 1791, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 112-114. 
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(instigated in large part by the actions of the Commission of Twelve itself) led to the Committee 
of General Security attaining unrivalled authority.14 
By contrast, the Committee of Public Safety was established in March 1793, just before the 
fall of the Girondins. It was created at the instigation of the Committee of General Defence, with 
the intention that it would be responsible for all legislation governing the defence of the nation 
both internally and externally. This exceptionally broad remit allowed the Committee of Public 
Safety to encroach ever more on every aspect of the business of government. This period of 
Revolutionary Government, typified by the Reign of Terror, is perhaps the most heavily studied 
of the French Revolution, and there is little that could be added here to further an understanding 
of this turbulent time.15 
Nevertheless, it is important to realise the significance of the Committee of Public Safety 
and the Committee of General Security as the organs perceived to be responsible for the Terror. 
It is only with such an understanding that the proscription of permanent committees during the 
Directory can be properly appreciated. When Robespierre and his fellow Jacobins were 
overthrown by the Thermidorian Reaction, it was not just the individuals who were attacked. As 
much as they were decried and scourged, so too were the institutions that they had embodied 
and which had enabled their usurpation of power. Above all, the governmental committees were 
seen as both the cause and the means of the Terror. As the Thermidorians set about the task of 
crafting their own origin story, casting themselves as the innocent victims of Jacobin tyranny, the 
committees posed a significant problem.16 On the one hand, the committees were synonymous 
with the regime that had just been overthrown and thus had to be dissolved. Yet the threats to 
the Republic, both external and internal, that had instigated the ascension of the committees 
were still present. How could they maintain any sort of order without the established 
governmental structures? The short answer was that they could not: both the Committee of 
                                                          
14 ibid., p. 306. 
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studies see Marisa Linton, Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship, and Authenticity in the French Revolution, (Oxford: 
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Public Safety and the Committee of General Security survived Thermidor, though they were 
profoundly changed. The membership of each was increased while the number of executive 
positions was reduced.17 Various other structural changes were implemented in order to reduce 
the powers of the committees; however, it was evident that this could only be a short term 
solution. In order to move beyond the Terror a new regime would be required, and there could 
be no hint of the possibility of a return to the tyranny of committees over the legislature. Not 
only was a new constitution required, so too was a revision of the entire model of French 
parliamentarianism. 
The preclusion of permanent committees by the Constitution of 1795 was evidently a 
profound departure from the established, if still fledgling, model of parliamentarianism during 
the Revolution. How, then, did the two councils of the Directory respond and organise 
themselves? Answering this question will not only clarify some of the practical aspects of French 
parliamentarianism under the Directory but will go some way to explaining the difficulty the 
regime had in accomplishing its aim of a stable and moderate republican government. 
Two initial observations are worth making at this point. Firstly, there was a shift in 
terminology that accompanied the ban on permanent committees, presumably in part to avoid 
ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞd precisely the same function 
that temporary committees had done in previous assemblies, the use of a different term served 
to distance their status from that of the earlier committees. This nomenclature emphasises both 
the subordinate nature of the commissions in their relationship to their respective Council and 
their transience: they were commissioned for a single, specific task, on which they were merely 
to report and make recommendations before dissolving back into the Council from whence they 
came. Similarly, there was to be no mistaking membership of a commission as a sign of special 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽƌƌĂŶŬ ?ĂƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶ ‘DĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨ
WƵďůŝĐ^ĂĨĞƚǇ ?ŽƌŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƉƌĞ-eminent committees had been worn as a sort of title. By 
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stark contrast, membership of a special commission was intended to imply nothing about an 
individual deputy except that they were a deputy of one of the legislative councils. 
The switch in terminology also allowed served to distinguish these commissions from the 
ŽŶĞ ?ǀĞƌǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ?comité) was still used during the Directory. 
Article Sixty-Six of the Constitution of 1795 (immediately preceding the ban on permanent 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚƚŚĞƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŽf one hundred of its members, each Council can form 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝŶƚŽ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ďƵƚŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ? ĂŶĚŶŽƚ ƚŽ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ? ?18 This 
secret committee bore little resemblance to the committees of earlier regimes, consisting of the 
entire Council rather than a small group selected to treat a topic outside of the general assembly. 
Again, this emphasised the distance the framers of the Constitution of 1795 were attempting to 
create between the committees of the Convention and the new regime. The power to form a 
secret committee appears to have been exercised very rarely by the two councils, almost solely 
for matters of foreign relations such as peace treaties or alliances.19 There was only one 
significantly different matter that the councils felt warranted discussion in secret, that of the 
denunciation of a deputy in the Council of Five-Hundred, Drouet, for conspiring to overthrow the 
Directory. Given his status as a deputy, the trial and punishment of Drouet posed a significant 
problem for the Directorial regime, itself still relatively young and susceptible to the aftershocks 
of even a foiled plot, and the ability to hold their discussions of his guilt in secret was no doubt a 
welcome protection.20 
The second observation to be made is the disparity in the number of commissions created 
by each of the Council of Five-Hundred the Council of Elders. While the Five-Hundred was 
veritably awash with commissions, the Elders very rarely felt the need to delegate its tasks to 
smaller groups. There were a number of reasons for this disparity. Perhaps the most obvious 
reason can be found in the nature of the respective councils. Commissions were primarily used 
to draft legislative proposals, a power which the Council of Elders lacked. Intended to simply 
                                                          
18 Constitution of 1795, Article Sixty-Six, in Troper, Terminer la Révolution, Annexe 8. 
19 AN, C//502, dossier 392/2-8. 
20 E ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŽƐƐŝĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WƌŽĐğƐ-ǀĞƌďĂƵǆĚĞƐƐĠĂŶĐĞƐƐĞĐƌĞƚĞƐĚĞƐĚĞƵǆŽŶƐĞŝůƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŵĞŶƚăů ?ĐƚĞ
Ě ?ĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚƌĞůĞZĞƉƌĠƐĞŶƚĂŶƚĚƵWĞƵƉůĞƌŽƵĞƚƉƌĠǀĞŶƵĚĞĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚƌĞůĂZĠƉƵďůŝƋƵĞ ? ? 
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approve or reject the resolutions of the Council of Five-Hundred, the Elders had little cause to 
distribute their workload. Furthermore, the size of the respective councils may also explain why 
the Elders were less inclined towards commissions. Part of the attraction of commissions and 
committees was the opportunity they gave their members to participate more actively in a small 
group setting than they could in the crowded assembly halls. Consisting of 250 seats, the Council 
of Elders was by no means a small group. Nevertheless, it was significantly smaller than any of 
the previous assemblies. Indeed, the size of assemblies had gradually reduced over the course of 
the Revolution, starting at well over one thousand in the National Assembly, down to 745 in the 
Legislative Assembly and 750 in the Convention, and finally settling on the 750 seats spread 
across two councils during the Directory.21 Given that most of its members had spent time in 
those earlier assemblies, even a fully-attended session of the Council of Elders must have felt to 
them a comparatively open and accessible space. It was thus less pressing to defer the business 
of the Council to smaller groups. 
Given this large disparity between the two councils in regard to commissions, the bulk of 
the present chapter will be concerned with the special commissions of the Council of Five-
Hundred, where they played almost a daily role. Nevertheless, the commissions of the Elders are 
interesting precisely for their rarity and will be addressed in the context of how the long-
established committee system was transformed not only by the exclusion of permanent 
committees, but also adapted to the newly created bicameral system. 
There were hundreds of special commissions created by the Council of Five-Hundred 
between 1795 and 1799.22 The specifics of their formation and operation are not immediately 
obvious, and must be deduced from a combination of sources. In some cases, there is a wealth 
of documentation of their work, such as that of the various commissions of finances or the 
fascinating Commission of the Inspectors of the Meeting Hall, which understandably created 
                                                          
21 E. Hindie Lemay & A. Patrick, Revolutionaries at Work: The Constituent Assembly 1789-1791, (Oxford: Voltaire 
Society, 1996), p. 16, and Godechot, Les Institutions de la France, p. 78 & p. 275. 
22 AN, C/II/24 & 26-28. 
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detailed accounts and contributed heavily to significant debates in the Council.23 Most helpfully, 
from the Year V (1796-1797), every special commission created by the Council of Five-Hundred 
was recorded in a four-volume register, noting the date of creation, the title of the commission, 
the names of its members, a description of its remit, and the location of documents pertaining 
to the commission within the archives of the Council.24 From these records some broad 
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the special commissions as a whole. 
Membership of the special commissions provides some initial insights to the new system, 
and in particular highlights the sharp break with the former committee system. In terms of 
numbers the commissions were almost universally small, even by the standards of the 
Revolution. Virtually no commission appears to have consisted of more than five members, and 
the most common number was three.25 Even the commissions of finances conformed to this 
apparent restriction: to take the example of Year VI, the committee was technically composed of 
55 members, these were spread evenly across eleven sub-committees covering particular areas 
or ministries.26 By contrast, for most of the Revolution committees had been formed of around 
ten to twelve members; for instance, there were twelve members in the first Committee for the 
Constitution in 1789 and ƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨWƵďůŝĐ^ĂĨĞƚǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
1795 had been drafted by the Commission des Onze.27 
In proscribing permanent committees, the Constitution of 1795 had not given any 
directions regarding the size of the special commissions it condoned. The reduction in numbers, 
then, can only be attributed to the deputies themselves. There was a clear practical reason for 
keeping the size of most of the commissions low. While the earlier committees had received 
broad remits which demanded a wider range of expertise or opinion, the special commissions 
                                                          
23 See, for instance, the ledger of the Commission of Inspectors in AN C/II/25, or the collection of receipts and 
reports (most of them agonising over the imbalance in the books) from the Commission of Finances in AN C//503 
dossier 393/5. 
24 AN, C/II/24 & 26-28. Each volume corresponds to a year (C/II/24 for year IV; /26 for year V; /27 for year VI; and 
/28 for year VII) and the commissions are recorded according to their initial letter, then by date. In the absence of 
page numbers, specific references will be to the title and date (in the Revolutionary calendar) of commissions 
discussed. 
25 ibid. 
26 AN, C/II/27, Finances, 1 Messidor. 




complained about the lack of reparations he had received after an administrator had damaged 
his property, it is understandable that the Council felt the matter warranted a commission of no 
more than three deputies.28 Nevertheless, not all commissions were of such relative 
ŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ?/ĨĂƉƚĂŝŶ'ĂŝůůĂƌĚ ?ƐĚĂŵĂŐĞĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽf three deputies, 
how is it that a report from the War Council was also addressed by a three-member 
commission?29 One result of keeping the special commissions small, especially when coupled 
with the limit on their duration, was to ensure that no commission was likely to exert undue 
influence over the rest of the Council. This reflected the desire of the deputies in the councils of 
the Directory to remain faithful to the intention of the constitutional framers (most of whom 
were, of course, also deputies) to prevent the emergence of any particularly powerful organ 
within the legislature. 
The range of topics that prompted the creation of these commissions was vast, and defies 
an attempt at categorisation. At one end of the spectrum there were commissions to tackle what 
might be called the grand tasks of governance, such as the commission of the colonies or the 
commission for finances. Indeed, the latter was arguably among the most important functions of 
the Council of Five-Hundred, which had been granted controůŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚďǇƚŚĞ
constitution. This was to be a consistent source of tension between the Council and the executive 
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƚƌĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ
provides a fascinating insight to the dynamics of power and influence that developed between 
the two bodies. 
However, the great majority of commissions were created for far more transient purposes. 
In the registers of the special commissions, the most frequent type of titles is those that refer to 
administrative departments or specific cantons, cities, and towns. In many cases little other 
information is recorded, particularly in regard to the remit. To discover the specific focus of the 
 “ƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƌŽƌĚĞĂƵǆ ?ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŽn 27 Nivôse year VII (16 January 1799), for example, 
                                                          
28 E ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŽƐƐŝĞƌ ? ? ? ‘WĠƚŝƚŝŽŶĚƵŝƚŽǇĞŶ:ĂĐƋƵĞƐ'ĂŝůůĂƌĚ ? ?E ? ?// ? ? ? ?'ĂŝůůĂƌĚ ? ?&ƌŝŵĂŝƌĞ ? 
29 AN, C/II/28, Conseil de Guerre, 6 Nivôse. 
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ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽ “ƐĞĞůĞƚƚĞƌ ‘^ ?ŝŶĨŽůĚĞƌŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂ
missive sent by the central bureau of the canton informing the Council of various generalities 
about thĞďƵƌĞĂƵ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?30 The fact that such a letter apparently required the creation of a 
special commission is somewhat bemusing, even more so given that besides the aforementioned 
letter no documentation seems to have emanated from the commission, although given that the 
register does not list any members in this commission (or most of those like it) this lack of output 
is perhaps not so surprising. 
Usually more detail is given for commissions related to geographical locations, however, 
especially during election periods. The electoral process was constitutionally scheduled to begin 
with the canton-based primary assemblies meeting on 1 Germinal (around 21-22 March 
depending on the year) before proceeding to the departmental electoral assemblies, which were 
charged with electing national deputies among other higher level offices, on 20 Germinal (9-10 
April). The Council of Five-Hundred and the executive Directory alike kept a wary eye on these 
assemblies, and made a habit of reviewing the procès-verbaux of the sessions of each electoral 
assembly, if not the primary assemblies. The months following the elections saw a flurry of 
activity in the Council of Five-Hundred, with dozens of commissions being appointed to examine 
the reports emanating from around the nation. In the Year VI (1797-1798), for instance, between 
28 Germinal and 4 Prairial (17 April-23 May) there were a total of 50 special commissions created 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ “ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ “procès-verbaux ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů ?Žƌ
departmental assemblies.31 Furthermore, most of these commissions consisted of four or five 
members, a relatively high number for commissions during the Directory. Particular attention 
was given to assemblies where a scission, or schism in the assembly, had occurred, such as in the 
primary assembly of the south-western canton of Salliés in year VII.32 These assemblées 
scissionaires formed in cantons or departments where one faction (usually consisting of 
republicans loyal to the Directory) believed that the official assembly was violating the 
Constitution or was simply acting unfairly and had been a growing feature of the electoral system 
                                                          
30 E ? ?// ? ? ? ?ŽƌĚĞĂƵǆ ? ? ?EŝǀƀƐĞ ?ĂŶĚE ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŽƐƐŝĞƌ ? ? ? ‘>ĞƚƚƌĞĞŶǀŽǇĠĞĂƵŽŶƐĞŝůĚĞƐŝŶƋ-Cents par le 
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐĞŶƚƌĂůĚƵĐĂŶƚŽŶĚĞŽƌĚĞĂƵǆ ? ? 
31 AN, C/II/27. 
32 AN, C/II/28, Sallies, 27 Prairial. 
78 
 
over the course of the Directory.33 In fact, the Directory encouraged such schisms, which were 
often used as a pretext for annulling electoral results deemed unfavourable to the regime.34 
It is interesting, therefore, that the Council of Five-Hundred would take such close interest 
in the proceedings of these assemblies. There was ongoing tension between the legislature 
(primarily expressed through the Council of Five-Hundred) and the executive Directory, with each 
trying to exert influence over the other. Elections were a key arena for this conflict, with the 
Directory working hard to ensure the return of candidates who would be amenable to their 
agenda, either by running election campaigns (an unprecedented feature of French politics) 
through their commissaires in the departments or by encouraging scissions which could then be 
used to exclude whichever assembly elected unfavourable candidates.35 That the Council of Five-
Hundred was appointing commissions to pore over the reports from these assemblies is evidence 
of their awareness of the electoral gamesmanship being employed by the Directory. It is more 
difficult, however, to determine the extent to which their obsession with the electoral assemblies 
ƐƚĞŵŵĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĐŽ-
operate. It seems to have changed on a yearly basis, as we can discover from both the reports 
emanating from several of the commissions investigating the electoral assemblies and the 
broader historical narrative of the Directory. 
The case of the elections of Year VI, which gained such extensive attention from the 
commissions of the Five-Hundred, was a rare example of the executive and legislature working 
relatively well alongside each other. Following the ĐŽƵƉ Ě ?ĠƚĂƚ of 18 Fructidor Year V (4 
September 1797), when royalist electoral successes were reversed by a purge of the councils and 
the closure of right-wing newspapers, the Directory had encouraged the spread of left-wing, anti-
royalist sentiment by relaxing restrictions on political clubs.36 The freshly purged councils were 
thus weakened against the Directory, but the individual deputies were in any case intent on 
                                                          
33 M. Crook, Elections in the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 145-146. 
34 ibid., pp. 146-147. 
35 ibid., and W. Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 328-329. 
36 Doyle, Oxford History, pp. 331-332. 
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maintaining their own positions which had been strengthened by the neutering of the royalist 
ĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǇŚĂĚŶŽĐŽŵƉƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ? 
However, as the Germinal elections drew nearer, it became clear that the royalist 
suppression had gone too far and allowed the resurgence of neo-Jacobins who posed just as 
much a threat to the Directory, which at the time was dominated by a moderate majority of 
Barras, Reubell, and La Revellière->ĞƉĂƵǆ ?ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĚƵďďĞĚƚŚĞ ‘dƌŝƵŵǀŝƌƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐ ?37 The 
indulgences the left had been granted following Fructidor were reversed and on 12 Pluviôse Year 
s/ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƐƉĂƐƐĞĚĂůĂǁĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ “ƚŽǀĞƌŝĨǇ ?ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
of the electoral assemblies, ostensibly in order to ensure that they were conforming to the 
Constitution.38 This law demonstrates the commitment of the deputies in the Corps Législatif to 
the institution of commissions, putting them at the very centre of the verification work. As the 
procès-verbaux from the departmental electoral assemblies arrived, the Council of Five-Hundred 
was to appoint commissions of up to five members to assess five procès-verbaux at once. Having 
decided to approve or annul each assembly, both the procès-verbaux and the accompanying 
reports from the commissions of the Five-Hundred were sent to the Council of Elders which was 
then to appoint its own commissions, each one again examining five procès-verbaux at once but 
with only three members. The reduction in numbers is probably more reflective of the smaller 
pool of potential commission members in the Elders compared to the Five-Hundred than it is of 
the perceived importance of the respective councils. Nevertheless, this discrepancy does reflect, 
intentionally or not, the gap between the influence of the Five-Hundred and that of the Elders. 
Throughout the verification process of Year VI there does not seem to have been a single instance 
where a commission of the Elders overturned the findings of the commissions of the Five-
Hundred. Again, while this fact alone does not necessarily indicate a complete lack of initiative 
on the part of the Elders (following the coup of 18 Fructidor the composition of the two councils 
was largely homogenous, so a high degree of consensus between them ought not to be overly 
                                                          
37 Crook, Elections, pp. 150-153; M. Lyons, France Under the Directory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975), pp. 221-223; Doyle, Oxford History, p. 330. 
38 AN, C//428, dossier 135/17- ? ? ? ‘>ŽŝƋƵŝĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞůĂŵĂŶŝğƌĞĚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚĞƌăůĂǀĠƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƐƉŽƵǀoirs des 
députés nouvellement élus au Corps->ĠŐŝƐůĂƚŝĨ ? ? ? ?WůƵǀŝƀƐĞĂŶ ? ?ŝŶ: ? ?ƵǀĞƌŐŝĞƌ (ed.), Collection Complète des 




surprising), it certainly does not harm the argument that the Council of the Elders was in practice 
a significantly less important body than the Constitution of 1795 had originally intended. 
Since the new legislature was due to open on 1 Prairial (20 May), it was necessary for the 
Council of Five-Hundred to work rapidly to ratify as many pro-Directorial electoral assemblies as 
possible before that time. They were aided in this task by a stream of messages from the 
Directory indicating the departments most likely to require suppression and those whose results 
were probably acceptable. For instance, the electoral assembly of Haroué, in the eastern 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨDĞƵƌƚŚĞ ?ǁĂƐƐŝŶŐůĞĚŽƵƚĨŽƌŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ “ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ “ĂŶĂƌĐŚŝƐƚƐ ? ?
as the radical revolutionaries of the left were increasingly known, who were accused of 
intimidation and tampering with ballots.39 The commissions of the Five-Hundred seem to have 
taken this to heart. The commission charged with examining the electoral assemblies of the 
Basses-Alpes, Gemmappes, Hautes-Pyrénées, Vaucluse, and Eure-et-Loir departments praised the 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂĚƐĞĐĞĚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘assemblée mère ? ?ĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ
assemblées scissionaires ŝŶƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ “terrorism ?ƚŚĞǇƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐŽŵĞ
of the electors in the assemblée mère P “/ƚŝƐƚƌƵůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐůĞƐƐĚĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
arbitrary arrests, and mistreatments preceded and even accompanied the primary assembly of 
the canton of Forcalquier ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ ŐĂǀĞ ĐĂƵƐĞ ĨŽƌ Ă ũƵƐƚ ƐĐŚŝƐŵ ? ?40 The 
commission went on to denounce certain electors as anarchists before eventually declaring the 
assemblée mère annulled and the assemblée scissionaire approved. Interestingly, they noted the 
charges levelled at those participating in the schismatic assembly by those of the assemblée 
mère ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƉŽƌƚďǇŚŽƉŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? “ŝĨŝƚŝǌĞŶBarrière [the approved deputy] really is 
a man of infamy, may his presence not defile the senate; if he is, on the contrary, of the 
                                                          
39 E ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŽƐƐŝĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DĞƐƐĂŐĞƌĠůĂƚŝĨĂƵǆŝƌƌĠŐƵůĂƌŝƚĠƐĚĂŶƐůĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĠůĞĐƚŽƌĂůĞƐĚĞů ?ĂƐƐĞŵďůĠĞ
Ě ?,ĂƌŽƵĠ ?DĞƵƌƚŚĞ ? ? ? 
40 BN 8-Le43-1960, ZĂƉƉŽƌƚĞƚWƌŽũĞƚĚĞZĠƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƉĂƌŶŐĞƌƌĂŶ ?ĂƵŶŽŵĚĞůĂĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĐŚĂƌŐĠĞĚ ?ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƌůĞƐ
procès-verbaux des assemblées électorales des départemens des Basses-Alpes, Gemmappes, Hautes-Pyrénées, 
Vaucluse, Eure-et-Loir, Séance du 18 floréal an VI (7 May 1798), (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, Floréal an VI), p. 10. 
Emphasis retained from the original. 
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honourable class of pure republicans, may he enter here to defend the sovereignty, the rights, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂũĞƐƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?41 
 “ŶĂƌĐŚŝƐƚ ? ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ǁĞƌĞ ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚe messages from the 
Directory to the Five-Hundred over the course of Floréal year VI. One particular message, sent on 
 ? ?&ůŽƌĠĂů ? ?DĂǇ ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂůŽŶŐůŝƐƚŽĨĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŵŽƐƚůǇĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ “ĂŶĂƌĐŚŝƐƚƐ ?
but also recounting some Royalist activity, at electoral assemblies around the nation, from 
Perpignan, where the constitution was attacked and a new regime called for; through Vaucluse, 
ǁŚĞƌĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚƌŝŽƚƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚǁŝƚŚĐĂůůƐŽĨ “ǁĂƌŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ŽǁŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 ? ? ? ?tĂƌĂŶĚĚĞĂƚŚƚŽƚŚĞdŚĞƌŵŝĚŽƌŝĂŶƐ ? ? ?ƚŽDĞƚǌǁŚĞƌĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŚĂŝůĞĚ “ǁŝƚŚĂƵĚĂĐŝƚǇ ?DĂƌĂƚ ?
Robespierre, and Babeuf.42 A special commission was formed on 14 Floréal to examine this 
message, and on 18 Floréal presented its findings in a report that included a proposed law which 
would annul the results of over 100 electoral assemblies, including every assembly in eight 
departments and affecting almost half of all departments.43 Approved by the Elders four days 
later, the law of 22 Floréal ultimately purged 127 deputies from the legislature before they had 
even taken their seats, and constituted another ĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ on the part of the Directory, less 
ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚŽĨ&ƌƵĐƚŝĚŽƌďƵƚŶŽůĞƐƐĂĐĂƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ “ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇƐĞĞŵĞĚ
to predominate over the general ǁŝůů ? ?ĂƐ:ĞĂŶĞďƌǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶŚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŽĨ
18 Floréal.44 Perhaps surprisingly, Debry was actually speaking in defence of the proposal, arguing 
ƚŚĂƚŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁŝůůǁĂƐǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞŚydra 
ŽĨ ĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĐŽƌĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ŚĂĚ
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶďǇŝƚƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?45 
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The level of co-operation between the Directory and the Five-Hundred at this point is a 
particularly important question. Indeed, Suratteau argues that the commission charged with 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽĨ ? ?&ůŽƌĠĂůĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞĐĂŵĞĂƚŽŽůŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇĂƚĂ
critical moment for the regime.46 /ŶŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞǁĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƉĞrsuade 
the deputies of the Five-Hundred that the process of verification was taking too long, and that in 
the face of such virulent animosity towards the regime it would be too dangerous to allow 
unverified deputies to take their seats in the new legislature. It was a gambit used in the hope of 
avoiding repetition of 18 Fructidor: rather than having to purge troublesome deputies from the 
legislature, it would be far better to simply prevent them from arriving in the first place. The 
commission, for its part, was adamant that the resolution it proposed was entirely its own: it may 
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐƌĂĨƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇ
claimed to have confirmed that information themselves and, more importantly, they rejected the 
notion that the Directors had played any part in the authorship of the resolution.47 The 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƉŽŬĞƐƉĞƌƐŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?ĂŝůůĞƵů ?ŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĐŽŵĞƵŶĚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐĐĂƌĞĨƵůƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞŝŶŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞproject is the work of the commission 
ĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ? ?48 ^ƵƌĂƚƚĞĂƵ ?ƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌŝŶƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵƉŽĨ&ůŽƌĠĂů ?ůďĞƌƚ
Meynier, suspected collusion between the Directory and the commission but concluded that if it 
had taken place then it had left no definitive proof.49 Suratteau, on the other hand, views it as 
little short of a coup against the legislature on the part of the executive Directory: while he 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚƐ DĞǇŶŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ  “ƉƌŽŽĨ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌŝĐƚ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ? ŚĞ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌe is 
sufficient circumstantial evidence to find the Directory guilty of coercion.50 The fact that the 
commission did not seek further information from the Directory by way of an official message, 
ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŝƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽďĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ “ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇďy amicable agreement and outside the 
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Both Meynier and Suratteau are right to suspect that the Directory strongly influenced the 
Five-Hundred through this commission, however the evidence available does not seem to 
suggest that this influence was oppressive or even unconstitutional. On the part of the Directors, 
there is very little mention in their papers of the law of 22 Floréal. What few notes do exist 
suggest that they were hopeful that the legislature would have the same objectives as them and 
would thus come to the same conclusion without the need of strong-arming.52 The direct 
influence of the Directory on the commission does not seem to have extended beyond the 
original message, which nevertheless was very strongly worded and contained quite graphic and 
emotive descriptions of the disorder taking place in the electoral assemblies. The Directory felt, 
correctly, that if they provided the legislature with the right evidence then there would be no 
need to rise against it with armed force as they had done in Fructidor. The fact that the Corps 
Législatif passed the law of 22 Floréal is thus indicative more of the consensus between the 
Directory and the legislature at that moment than it is of a conspiracy. 
However, the Directors could have felt more secure that this tactic would work thanks to 
the commission system itself. They knew that upon receipt of an official message from the 
Directory, the Five-Hundred would appoint a commission of only three to five members. This 
meant that rather than having to persuade the entire legislature to go along with what amounted 
to yet another coup against the legislature itself by the Directory, they merely had to convince 
ƚŚĞ ĨĞǁĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŶ ƌĞůǇŽŶ ƚŚĞŵƚŽĂĐƚĂƐ ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞďǇ
proxy. This was not as risky a strategy as it might first appear. While there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the Directors were able to influence who might be selected form the 
commission, they were quite aware that the sentiments of the majority of the Council were in 
favour of the Directory and so they no doubt felt quite confident that a pro-Directory commission 
would be appointed. For instance, the commissions charged with examining the operations of 
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84 
 
electoral assemblies up until 13 Floréal had almost uniformly found in favour of pro-Directory 
assemblies, which were usually the schismatic ones.53 Even in the rare event that a commission 
annulled the results of pro-Directory assemblies, it was usually because their behaviour was as 
violent or disorderly as those of the reactionary or radical assemblies they were supposedly 
replacing and in such cases both assemblies were rejected, as in the department of the Seine.54 
The responses to the proposed law are also revealing in this respect.55 There was significant 
debate of the proposal, especially in the Five-Hundred, a fact which must count against the 
accusation that the Council was coerced. In terms of numbers, responses delivered by deputies 
across the two councils were relatively evenly split between those in favour of the proposal (and 
therefore on the side of the Directory) and those against.56 However those in favour tended to 
speak decisively, couching their arguments in terms of finding the via media between the Royalist 
and Terrorist threats, which were evidently taken to be both very real and very dangerous.57 On 
the other side, however, objections tended to be against specific elements of the proposal or 
warning against the slippery slope that would result from a legislature effectively legislating 
against itself in favour of the executive.58 
In any case, the pro-ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ƐŝĚĞ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŚĂĚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ĚĂǇƐ ? ǁŽƌƚŚ ŽĨ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
information-gathering by the time the proposal was made on 18 Floréal, thanks to the work of 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?ǇƉůĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨ
special commissions, the Five-Hundred had stacked the odds in the favour of those commissions: 
any opposition was fighting an uphill battle from the very start. It was this fact, rather than any 
blatantly unconstitutional interference on the part of the Directory, that allowed the coup of 
Floréal to succeed. 
                                                          
53 Suratteau, >ĞƐ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58 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?'ĂƌƌĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ PE ?-Le43-1964, Opinion de Jean-Philippe Garran, sur le rapport relatif aux 
élections, Séance du 18 floréal an VI, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, an VI). 
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Commissions were not always allies of the Directory, however. The elections of Year VI 
came at one of the few times that the legislature and the executive were aligned. More often 
than not, the councils, and in particular the Five-Hundred, were suspicious of or outright opposed 
to the agenda of ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚ
to co-ordinate opposition. The Directory had no official power to initiate legislation; they could 
only send a message to the Council of Five-Hundred requesting that they consider a certain 
matter. These messages unfailingly prompted the creation of a special commission to examine 
them, as seen with the message of 13 Floréal Year VI. These commissions had mixed reactions to 
the messages, however, and can reveal much about the tenor of the relationship between the 
Five-Hundred and the Directory at any given point during the regime. Germinal to Prairial Year VI 
may have been a time of conciliation between the two bodies, resulting in the legislative coup of 
Floréal, but at other times the result of messages from the Directory was quite the reverse. 
Before 18 Fructidor Year V, for instance, the increasingly dominant Royalist faction chose to 
remain deaf to some of the requests of the Directory, such as when they invited the Five-Hundred 
to consider what to do with monasteries in the annexed Belgian lands.59 The Royalist deputy (and 
future victim of 18 Fructidor) Mailhe reported back on behalf of the commission tasked with 
considering this message at the very next session, with a single page report which simply stated 
that nothing was to be done about it.60 Other times the Council actively subverted the aims of 
the Directory, as when the executive attempted to suggest stronger measures against refractory 
priests in Floréal Year IV.61 Instead, the commission appointed for the message used it as an 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƌĞĨƌĂĐƚŽƌǇ ƉƌŝĞƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ
instead a relaxation of the laws against them.62 In both of these cases, the commissions were 
used as a sort of buffer between the Directory and the Council as a whole. The only constitutional 
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means of direct influence the Directory had over the Council of Five-Hundred was the use of 
these messages, and yet the Council could simply brush the message aside by delegating a small 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŽŶŝƚƐŽǁŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? 
In fact, the commissions of the Council of Five-Hundred were sometimes used to exert 
pressure on the Directory. One such example comes from Floréal Year V. The Council of Five-
Hundred had heard a rumour that the Minister of the Navy had sent a letter to the French 
colonies in the western Atlantic and Caribbean declaring that French citizens who left Saint 
Domingue, then in the middle of the Haitian Revolution, for another nation were to be treated 
ĂƐ “émigrés véritables ? ?ŽƌĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-revolutionaries.63 There was no small number of such citizens, 
who considered themselves to be refugees fleeing the slave rebellion and in most cases heading 
to the United States of America.64 In particular, one citizen by the name of Reux-Beaufort had 
been arrested in Saint Domingue on charges of emigration and brought to Rochefort for trial. The 
Five-Hundred was outraged not only that these people, who they were inclined to view as 
genuine refugees, were being unjustly deprived of rights and property, but also that the Directory 
may have allowed (or, as the Council suspected, ordered) such a directive to be sent without 
consulting the legislature. The Council issued a decree fiercely rebuking the Directory for such 
ůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌĞĨƵŐĞĞƐĨůĞĞŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞƌĂǀĂŐĞĂŶĚĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĚĞĂƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĞŶĂĐĞƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ĂďŽǀĞ Ăůů ĨŽƌ ĐŝƌĐƵŵǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?65 They 
demanded that the Directory clarify whether or not such an instruction had been sent by the 
Minister for the Navy, and in the meantime, if such an instruction had been sent it was to be 
immediately suspended (and, in the case of seizure of property, reversed) until the legislature 
had made a decision on a pending report from the Special Commission for the Occidental 
Colonies.66 
Several aspects of this affair are noteworthy. Firstly, it is a fascinating example of the 
legislature claiming authority against the Directory and enforcing that authority by means of a 
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special commission. Commissions were thus not only bodies used for the internal organisation of 
each council, but also tools that could be wielded against other groups. The appointment of a 
commiƚƚĞĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƐŝŐŶĂů ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
Directory or the other legislative Council, to fall into line. In fact, it is also worth briefly mentioning 
ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽƵŶĐŝůĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ? /Ŷ ŝƚƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚory, the Council of Five-Hundred 
unilaterally claimed to speak for the entire Corps Législatif. Yet the Council of Elders technically 
held a very powerful position in this stand-off between the Five-Hundred and the Directory. The 
Elders may have had only a single constitutional power, that of approval or rejection of 
resolutions, but if the Council so chose then it could become an extraordinarily frustrating power, 
particularly for the Five-Hundred. In this particular case, if the Elders chose to side with the 
Directory, then the Five-Hundred could appoint as many commissions or send as many official 
messages to the Directory as it wanted to no avail: without approval from the Elders, their 
resolutions meant nothing. In fact, the chips were stacked in the Elders favour in this regard, 
since article 99 of the Constitution of 1795 prevented a rejected resolution from being presented 
by the Five-Hundred until one year had passed.67 The Five-Hundred thus had to be confident that 
the Elders would be on their side, or else any action against the Directory would meet a swift 
defeat. Returning to the case at hand then, perhaps the most notable aspect regarding the 
Council of Elders is its complete absence. The Elders raised no objection to the resolution passed 
by the Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚ ?ďƵƚŶŽƌĚŝĚƚŚĞǇŵĂŬĞĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŶŽŝƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?ƐŵĂŶŶĞƌ
of exercising its executive powers; they simply approved the original decree from the Five-
Hundred and then sat back from the ensuing exchange between the Five-Hundred and the 
Directory.68 Once again, the discrepancy between the influence of the respective Councils is 
made plain. 
Another interesting feature of this incident is the commission mentioned in the Council of 
Five-,ƵŶĚƌĞĚ ?ƐĚĞĐƌĞĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞKĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůŽůŽŶŝĞs. What is particularly significant here is 
that the Five-Hundred did not create the commission at this time, only bestowed a new 
                                                          
67 Constitution of 1795, Article 99, in Troper, Terminer la Révolution, Annexe 8. 
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responsibility on an extant commission.69 This is seemingly a minor detail, but one which has 
fascinating implications. Given that commissions were supposed to dissolve themselves at the 
conclusion of the specific task they were formed to undertake, it ought to have been virtually 
impossible for this action to occur. Indeed, according to a strict reading of article 67 of the 
Constitution it was outright impossible: rather than adding a new aspect to the remit of an 
existing and relevant commission, even in the unlikely event that such a commission happened 
to exist, a brand new commission ought to have been created specifically for the new issue. 
The fact that such a commission already existed, and especially with a remit as broad as 
 “KĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůŽůŽŶŝĞƐ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐǁĞƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽďĞĨůĞǆŝďůĞǁŝƚŚ
the constitutional ban on permanent committees. There does not appear to be much evidence 
of such behaviour in the register of commissions created by the Five-Hundred. Commissions with 
remits that would be expected to arise frequently, such as the commission of finances, do appear 
in the register at fairly regular intervals, and generally with a different membership each time.70 
However, a closer reading of these records in conjunction with various reports delivered to the 
Council reveals various discrepancies. The Commission of Finance appointed on 23 Prairial Year 
s// ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ǁĂƐ “ƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶĂůůŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞ
been sent to the so-ĐĂůůĞĚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?71 To give the deputies the benefit of the 
doubt, this by itself does not imply the existence of an ongoing Commission of Finances, merely 
that the Council had received many documents addressed to such a commission; indeed, the fact 
that there was a need to appoint a commission just to sort through these documents might have 
been evidence that no such commission existed. That hypothesis is weakened, however, by the 
number of reports given in the name of the Commission of Finances, especially when the dates 
of such reports are compared with those of the commissions recorded in the register. When the 
new legislature assembled (minus those purged in Floréal) on 1 Prairial Year VI (20 May 1798), 
ƌĂƐƐŽƵƐǁĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂďůĞƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů “ŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?
specifically relating to a message sent by the Directory the previous 3 Pluviôse (22 January 1798) 
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70 For instance, for Year VII see the Commissions of Finances appointed on 1 Brumaire, 6 Ventôse, 26 Germinal, and 
23 Prairial. C/II/28, all under section F. 
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about the liquidation of the assets of émigrés in nine departments.72 The four month delay 
between the receipt of the message and the proposal of a resolution is already cause for 
suspicion, but furthermore, according to the register the most recently appointed Commission 
of Finances was recorded on 14 Brumaire (4 November 1797), a further three months before the 
message from the Directory.73 There is also no record of a special commission being appointed 
around 3 Pluviôse under any other name that might have arisen from this message. Commissions 
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇǁĞƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ‘Directoire 
exécutif ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǇĞƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĂƚŶƚƵƌĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞ
samĞŐŽĞƐĨŽƌƚŝƚůĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘Liquidation ? ?Žƌ ‘Émigrés ? ?74 The only conclusion, then, is that there 
was a Commission of Finances operating throughout this period and without record in the official 
register. Other examples of the Commission of Finances operatiŶŐ ‘ŽĨĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚ
within months of the commencement of the Directory. Reports or proposals of resolutions were 
delivered in the name of the Commission of Finances on 12 Prairial and 9 Fructidor Year IV (31 
May and 26 August 1796), bearing no clear correlation to the commissions recorded in the 
register on 5 Frimaire and 28 Pluviôse (26 November 1795 and 17 February 1796).75 
In proscribing permanent committees in the Constitution of 1795, the Thermidorians 
sought both to distance themselves from the legacy of the Jacobin Convention and to prevent 
the emergence of a powerful cabal within the assembly (or assemblies). They failed to realise 
that committees were an essential aspect of French parliamentarianism, and by neglecting to 
provide an alternative organisational framework they set the councils of the Directory a no-win 
scenario. The councils could choose to either follow the letter of the Constitution and drown in 
an endless river of commissions that lacked the continuity to effectively address long-term issues 
like finances and the military, or they could succumb to pragmatism and establish somewhat 
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covert standing committees that could act efficiently but which undermined the legitimacy of the 
constitution. The councils made their situation worse by vacillating between these two models, 
continuing to operate by myriad special commissions for the most part while resorting to 
permanent commissions in certain areas. 
Nevertheless, the evolving role of commissions in the parliamentary practice of the 
Directory reveals the innovation that continued to typify French revolutionary politics. The use 
of commissions as a means of influence both for and against the executive Directory was a 
fascinating development, and is vital to understanding how the various coups of the period were 
planned and carried out. Furthermore, if the deputies undermined the legitimacy of the 
constitution by forming permanent commissions, these commissions were vastly different to the 
governmental committees that had dominated the Convention. The commission system during 
the Directory was a novelty in this respect, managing to adapt the committee system so essential 
to French parliamentarianism to a political system which so feared the accumulation of power in 





When the Directory was established in late 1795, it raised few hopes that the new regime 
would be any more successful than the previous attempts at stability. It was founded on a 
byzantine constitution, written in haste by legal experts who bound their new regime in layers of 
checks and entanglements in their desire to cool, though not extinguish, the revolutionary fire of 
French government. The new councils consisted mostly of deputies from the old, failed 
Convention, deputies whose self-preserving measures had hardly won them new supporters. The 
new system borrowed elements of previous regimes, while adding to them institutions that had 
been thoroughly opposed and rejected in earlier constitutional discussions, most notably 
bicameralism. The new constitution even specifically proscribed the formation of committees, 
which up to that point had been arguably the most important and effective innovation in the 
nascent French democratic culture. There seemed to be every reason for pessimism about the 
Directory at its inception. 
And yet it endured. In spite of the burden of a continuing and expanding war without, and 
the threat, alternately, of radical democrats and of royalists within, the Directory outlasted every 
revolutionary regime before it, and continued to function reasonably effectively until at last it 
was brought undone by a cabal of conspirators on 18 Brumaire. This achievement should not be 
underappreciated. The Legislative Assembly of 1791 was founded on a constitution that was the 
fruit of almost two years of labour by some of the most intelligent, accomplished, and highly-
educated men in France (some of whom, it must be said, would go on to contribute to the 
Constitution of 1795), and yet it collapsed within a year of its inauguration, its architects failing 
to equip the regime to meet the problems that arose when the king became hostile to it. The 
Directory, by contrast, lasted four times as long, despite all the odds seemingly being stacked 
against it. 
That the Directory was flawed in indisputable. Every election held during its existence was 
ŵĂƌƌĞĚďǇǀŽƚŝŶŐŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƚĞŶĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚby annulments or 
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coups. That the regime could have persisted effectively for much longer were it not for the 
intervention of Sieyès and Bonaparte is doubtful. Yet these negative aspects have unfairly 
overshadowed the real innovations of the Directory, both institutionally and in the development 
of parliamentary practices that would prove profoundly influential, if unrecognised as such, in 
the nineteenth century. By introducing a form of bicameralism distinct to that of either Britain or 
America, the Directory established a precedent that would be followed by nearly every one of 
the procession of regimes over the course of the succeeding century, the sole exception being 
the Second Republic ?ƐƵŶŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? 
The parliamentary methods that the Directorial deputies developed were likewise 
significant both in their departure from the practices of the early phases of the Revolution and in 
their legacy for future regimes. The creation of short-term commissions in the place of standing 
committees seemed at first to be a chaotic, inefficient model, dreamed up by potentially over-
cautious deputies still reeling from the failures of the Convention. Yet they proved that the 
parliamentary experiences of the first years of the Revolution did not have to be definitive. The 
parliamentary innovations of the Directory, both those in its constitutional foundation and in the 
ĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĐŝƌĐƵŵǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĂƚƐĂŵĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? are significant 
for having opened up the scope of what French democracy could become. While later 
generations may have sĐŽƌŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂĐǇ ŝŶ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚĞĚ
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